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INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OVER THE PRICING
OF RESOURCES: A CONFIGURATIVE APPROACH*
Mahnoush H. Arsanjani**
A. Introduction
Demand for a new definition and function of pricing more
compatible with changing community goals has increased during
the past few years. The ongoing battle between the developed
and the developing countries about reconstructing a pattern of
world trade for a more equitable distribution of values chal-
lenges traditional pricing theory. That theory appears to be
increasingly inadequate as an instrument of contemporary pol-
icy, fostering a system which makes the rich richer and the
poor poorer. The new demands require a more comprehensive con-
ception of the function of pricing and a reevaluation of the
factors to be taken into account in price determination.
Pricing cannot remain as an isolated economic theory, con-
sidered relevant only to a few problems, with objectives sep-
arated from the larger general community policies. Pricing
theory should be compatible with, and where possible contribute
to and support, all recommended general community policies as
an aspect of overall fiscal policy. It should be made to per-
form a much broader and more constructive role in protecting
common interests. To this end, we define pricing as a process
of decision precipitating multiple value effects throughout
all the communities affected. It is a process for allocating
the benefits and costs arising from use and enjoyment of re-
sources and for effecting a more general distribution of values.
The newer demands require that pricing perform the function,
not merely of allocating the benefits and costs arising from
the immediate exploitation of particular resources, but also of
securing a preferred distribution of values not necessarily
arising from the resources carrying a particular "price-tag."
The strategy of control over use and benefits of re-
sources by pricing has a long history. Pricing does in fact
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significantly influence every aspect of resource exploitation,
including production, processing, distribution and consump-
tion. The conception of pricing as related to particular re-
sources is not new. While definitions, functions and struc-
tures have of course undergone changes, the basic elements of
this conception have existed from the beginning of human eco-
nomic interaction; it has at times been influenced by re-
ligious ideology and later developed by, and expressed through,
the secular specialist languages of economists and political
scientists. The great bulk of theories about pricing have,
happily, always had some relation to the totality of community
policy; less happily, however, some of the more important the-
ories have had transempirical elements.
The narrow conception and limited function of pricing
in the Middle Ages, associated only with resource exchange,
has been replaced by much broader concepts affecting the whole
complex global process of value distribution. The Ideology of
the Middle Ages influenced by Christianity and Aristotle,
looked at economic activities as a process by which goods and
services were provided for the community to insure each of its
members security and freedom. The concept of profit making,
and the use of market opportunities to change prices at the
expense of the majority, was condemned morally and socially.
This ideology, in a way compatible with Islamic economic con-
cepts, held that individuals were entitled only to that rea-
sonable share of goods and services which satisfied their needs.
Any surplus belonged to the whole community. In that period
every resource had, in theory, a "just price"1 or justum pretium
which was equal to its cost of production. The just price was
not necessarily an economic but an ethical and social concept;
indeed, it concomitantly supported a policy against "unjust en-
richment." The manifest and ostensibly exclusive purpose of
the just price was to ensure equality as between producers and
consumers.
With the transformation of the social structure in the
1. For the Medieval concept of pricing see 7 Encyclo-
paedia of Social Sciences 504-507 (1935); J. Hulzinga, The
Waning of the Middle Ages (1924); J. Baldwin, The Medieval
Theories of Just Price (1959). For the history and the de-
velopment of pricing theory from the Middle Ages, see 11 Enc-
clopaedia of Social Sciences 355-387 (1935). For general
references on pricing theory see J. Bridge & P. McGregor,
Pricing Policies (1974); J. Angell, The Theory of International
Prices (1926); R. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allo-
cation (2d ed. 1961) and D. Hague, Price Formation in Various
Economies (1967).
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late Middle Ages and the development of specializations, new
technologies, new markets and new social configurations, the
pattern of resource use and distribution changed. With the ex-
pansion of the influence of the merchant groups and a new
ideology of economic activities, classical capitalism con-
sidered pricing the outcome of a so-called "free market" regu-
lated by an "invisible hand." The theory of laissez-faire
posited that the law of free market would determine the real
price of resources. To Adam Smith "[t]he real price of every
thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to
acquire It, Is the toil and trouble of acquiring it, and who
wants to dispose of it or exchange rt for something else, is
the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which
it can Impose upon other people.",2 In the free market system,
resources will eventually be available to those who offer the
highest prices. Nevertheless, this laissez-faire theory does
not answer, or gives a negative answer, to the questions of
whether the ones who pay more are the ones who deserve to con-
sume and whether this system is consistent with the goals of
a fair and equitable distribution of values. Moreover, it
ignores problems of resource scarcity, ecological deteriora-
tion and militates by its terms against a planning function.
Using a totally different perspective and promoting the
interest of a different class, Marxian theory was built upon
the metaphysical notion of materialistic determinism. Marx and
Engels replace the capitalist term of "pricing" with "value"
and define the "value" of each commodity as "determined by the
quantity of labor expended on and materialized in it; by the
working time necessary, under given social conditions for its
production." 3 Marx's concept of "value" or "pricing" is thus
close to the Christian and Islamic notion of just price. It
denies interest employed by the "bourgeois" society. For Marx
the "value" of a commodity is "[t]he objective from the social
labor expanded in its production," and is determined by "[tlhe
quantity of the labor contained in it.1'1
The concept of pricing, as demonstrated in an abundant
literature, has been the great battleground of most Inherited
2. A. Smith, Wealth of Nations 30 (E. Cannan ed. 1937).
See also D. Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and
Taxation (P. Fogarty ed. 1965). On the operation of the self-
regulating market system see also K. Polanyi, The Great Trans-
formation 29 (1944).
3. K. Marx, Capital In 50 Great Books of the Western
World 89-90 (1952), see also K. Marx I Capital Pt. Ill.
4. K. Marx, at 264.
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economic theories since the eighteenth century, when economics
became an independent social science, Some of the modern the-
ories regard pricing as a technique of fiscal control of con-
sumption. For these theories, pricing becomes of potential
importance in directing the use of resources. 5 When decision
makers address the problem of resource scarcity, pricing is
viewed as a strategy to regulate the magnitude of resource
consumption and to control the timing of resource use. In this
process the price level becomes one scheme for control of re-
source use to fulfill the policies of the decision makers.
While the limited function of the medieval notion of pricing
as a system of resource exchange has been recognized and em-
ployed, the potentially larger function of pricing as a scheme
of value distribution has never been fully developed. A later
theory of progressive taxation6 as a modality of income redis-
tribution indicates the recognized need for a reallocation of
values and supplies, a technique comparable to pricing for
securing such reallocation.
The difficulties inherent in all these theories empha-
sizes the importance both of establishing a more modern con-
ception of pricing and of outlining a contextual approach which
will include the various factors which should affect pricing
policy.
B. Factual Background
In the present world order, the structure and processes
of international trade have a close relationship with the sta-
bility and growth of national economies and have been "a regu-
lar and important feature of domestic politics." 7 A part of
this world trade structure Is the process of pricing, which
can be seen more substantially to affect the income of de-
veloping countries and primary producers than that of de-
5. A. Alchian & W. Allen, University Economics 102 (2d
ed. 1968).
6. Progressive taxation is defined as "one that takes a
larger proportion of high incomes than of low." P. Samuelson,
Economics: An Introductory Analysis 127 (4th ed. 195 . Pro-
gressive taxation Is the opposite of regressive taxation,
which regressive tax is one that takes larger proportion of low
incomes than high incomes. Income taxes, death and gift taxes
are examples of progressive taxation. Taxes on employment or
payroll taxes are regressive.
7. Reisman, "Trade Helps Traders: The Third World's
Fading Dream," Nation, June 12, 1976 at 716, 717; see also Muir,
"The Changing Legal Framework of International Energy Manage-
ment," 9 Int'l Law. 605, 613 (1975).
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veloped countries. This high impact is the result of the de-
pendency of the developing primary producers on a single com-
modity or a few commodities for their major export earnings.
Primary products In the early 1970's a counted for 80% to 90%
of the export of developing countries.° According to an UNCTAD
study, primary products, excluding oil exports, account for
two-thirds of the export earnings of developing countries.9
An IMF and IBRD study shows that the exports of these countries
have grown slowly relative to the growth of world trade and
relative to the Increase in imports necessary to sustain a
satisfactory rate of development in these countries.10 Among
commodities only petroleum, timber, Iron ore and bauxite have
had major growth; for most commodities demand has increased
slowly and the prices of such commodities have been subject to
much wider fluctuation than the export prices of industrial
countries.]] Exports of developing countries have been in ag-
ricultural raw materials and foodstuffs and have generated de-
creasing amounts of revenue for the exporting countries. The
most rapidly expanding commodities have been fuels and manu-
factured goods, followed by metals and minerals. In the 1960's
the foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials accounted for
more than half of the total primary products exports of de-
veloping countries, while in the 1950's their share was almost
two-thirds.12 The decline in the value of exports of primary
8. UNCTAD, 'rends and Policies in the First Four Years
of the Second Development Decade," TD/B/530/Add.l, at 7: IMF
and IBRD, (a joint staff study pt. 1), The Problem of Stabiliza-
tion of Prices of Primary Products 1 (1969). More than 80% of
Third World foreign exchange accrues from exports to the indus-
trial countries. E. Fried & C. Schultze (eds.), Higher Oil
Prices and the World Econor 186 (1975); G. Ranis (ed.), The
Gap Between Rich and Poor Nations 99 (1972). The present role
of developing countries is that of suppliers of raw materials
to the western industries and export markets for their manu-
factured products. See Trilateral Commission, A Turning Point
in North-South Economic Relations 19, 22 (1974).
9. See UNCTAD, spra note 8.
10. The Problem of Stabilization of Prices of Primary
Products, supra note 9, at 1.
I1. Id.
12. Exports of foodstuffs grew at a rate of 2.6% a year
and exports of agricultural raw materials at 1.1%. The de-
cline in demand has increased the downward pressure on the over-
all export growth rate of developing countries. See UNCTAD,
"Recent Developments and Long Term Trends in Commodity Trade,"
TD/9. Nov. 1967 in The Problems of Stabilization of Prices of
Primary Products, supra note 8, at 15.
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products in comparison to the increase in the export of manu-
factured products becomes more dramatic. Between the 1950's
and the mid-1960's the value of exports of developing coun-
tries grew at a compound rate of 4.7% a year. During the
same period the value of the exports of developed countries
rose at an annual rate of 7.2%.13 While the prices of pri-
mary products declined, the prices of manufactures which pre-
dominated the exports of developing countries tended to in-
crease.1 4 As a result of slow growth in the demand of exports
of developing countries and the decline in the prices of pri-
mary products in relation to manufactured goods, the share of
developing countries in world trade has steadily declined.
In the early 1950's the share was 27% but by the mid-1960's
it had fallen below 20%.15
The effects of price fluctuations on primary producers
are much more severe than on industrial producers. On the sur-
face, however, it may seem to be the reverse. One may argue
that trade depression manifests itself In developing countries
on farmers, while in industrial countries it does so on unem-
ployed workers. It is sometimes assumed that a farmer may
still be able to feed his family and himself even if de-
pression results in low production, but that unemployed work-
ers do not have even that opportunity. Yet experience in re-
cent years suggests a different outcome: "[mass unemployment
has not threatened the industrial countries and the Income
fluctuations they have suffered have been rather fluctuations
in the rate of increase of real income than alternating per-
iods of increase and decrease. The primary producing countries
on the other hand have suffered from time to time significant
declines in income . . .,,16 No matter how refined this argu-
ment becomes there is no doubt that high prices and wide fluc-
tuations in price of manufactured goods have tremendous nega-
tive effects on international trade in general and the de-
velopment process of developing countries in particular.17
Even if increases in prices of food, fertilizers and fuels are
ignored, and export power measured only by the prices of manu-
13. See 1966 UN Statistical Y.B. and GATT, International
Trade, cited-Tn The Problem of Stabilization of Prices, supra
note 8, at 11-12.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. S. Cane, Prices For Primary Producers 19 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Cane].
17. See UNCTAD, "Preservation of the Purchasing Power
of Developing-Countries' Exports," TD/184/Supp. 2, Mar. 5,
1976, at 3.
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factured goods, a study by UNCTAD shows that a substantial
number of developing countries recorded an increase in real
export earning of less than 7% (the minimum requirement for
development estimated by the International Development
Strategy for the 1970's) from 1970 to 1974.18 Studies by
UNCTAD and the World Bank show an annual decline of close to
2 percent (2.0 percent by UNCTAD and 1.7 percent by the World
Bank) in the trade of developing countries.1 9 Thirty-nine of
the developing countries accounted for one-third of the aggre-
gate export earnings of non-OPEC developing countries in 1970
but for more than 1/2 of the total population of these coun-
tries. 20 The maximum average increase in terms of purchasing
power of thirty-nine developing countries excluding OPEC coun-
tries over imports of manufacture was only 1.7% in 1970.20
One negative characteristic of contemporary world trade
is the unequal distribution of the total economic benefits from
the enjoyment of resources, as between producers and consumers.
With respect to oil, which has had the highest increase in
value, before the 1971 Tehran agreement royalties and taxes
were about $1 per barrel of refined oil for producer countries
while the share of the oil Importers in Western Europe in the
form of taxes was about $4.50 per barrel, which was sold for
about $8.00 in Europe.2 1 Such inequitable value distribution
was observable in a number of other commodities as well, par-
ticularly through the economic activities of multinationals.
For example, one of the practices of these corporations is
price determination of goods and services traded between the
18. Id., table I, at 4.
19. T6/I84/Supp.2, Mar. 5, 1976 at 6-9.
20. Id. See Reports by UNCTAD Secretariat, on 'W/orld
Economic Outlook,' TD.186. This study shows that virtually all
developing countries experienced severe falls in their real
export Income in 1975 as a result of the economic recession in
the industrialized countries. In 1976 and 1977 only a modest
recovery is expected.
21. Fortune, Mar. 1971, at 30. Although these figures
do not distinguish between "intercountry balance of payments
considerations and intracountry income distribution effects,
they are indicative of the wide scope within which income trans-
fers could have taken place between countries." Vaitsos,
"Power, Knowledge and Development Policy: Relations Between
Transnational Enterprises and Developing Countries," in
G. Helleiner (ed.), A World Divided: The Less Developed Coun-
tries in International Economy. 113, 128 (1976).
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corporation and its affiliates located In different countries.
Such price fixing affects the distribution of the benefits of
their activities between countries, as well as sometimes
paralyzing local competition,2 2 Intracorporate trade in
goods within multinationals contains more than one quarter
of the value of all international trade in goods, 23 and the
possibility for price manipulation is obviously quite exten-
sive.
The size of the market also discriminates against de-
veloping countries which must import. In comparison oil-
importing developing countries pay about 20% more to oil com-
panies than oil-importing developed countries, because of the
smallness and underdevelopment of their market.2 4 The so-
called fourth world, with a population of 900 million, 35% of
the population of the entire non-communist world, suffered
more from the high prices of o1125 than the first world of de-
veloped countries.
The lack of adequate inclusive competence in control of
pricing has been another characteristic of the International
market. Decisions regarding pricing have primarily been the
outcome of exclusive competences through monopoly or oligop-
oly, and only occasionally of partially inclusive competences.
The latter Is the more current practice. The earlier prac-
tices dominated by the multinationals were more In the nature
of oligopolistic or monopolistic control through their several
joint ventures.2 6 Exclusive control over pricing of resources
22. UN Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, "The Im-
pact of Multinational Corporations on Development and On In-
ternational Relations," UN Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1, ST/ESA/6, 88
(1974).
23. Id. at 88.
24. "T'--he developing countries are handicapped by the
smallness of their market which makes them stand at the end of
the consumer line for supplies and transport facilities; fur-
thermore they lack access to up-to-the-minute information
which is crucial in an industry characterized by fast changes
and secrecy." "Energy Crisis: Freezing the Poor," 1 Develop-
ment Forum (Geneva) No. 9, Dec. 1973, at 12 cited in
Z. Mikdashi, The International Politics of Natural Resources
69 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Mikdashi].
25. See S. Alexander, Paying For Energy 26-28 (1975).
For short-term and long-term higher prices of oil see Tims,
"The Developing Countries," in E. Fried & C. Schultze (eds.),
supra note 8 at 169-198.
26. Oligopoly is referred to as a market of a "few
sellers, each supplying a large part of total output, each be-
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could be exercised by a small group of corporations or a
single state. For example, the world depends on the United
States for approximately 90% of its soybeans. 2 7 A United
States decision to cut back production of exports of soy-
'beans will affect the price of this product dramatically.
Partially Inclusive competence has been exercised through
different forms of producers' associations. The closest ap-
proximation to Inclusive competence over pricing has been
achieved through commodity agreements. They are, in theory,
representative of both producers' and consumers' interests.
The impact of these practices on external and internal value -
processes will be examined later.
In the international market a functional concept.loiof:,opricing includes taxes, royalties, participation or,,ahy-teth-,
niques by which values are distributed. This wide a'ng':-"of i 
"
-
strategies available to major participants in the prcn
process, nation-states and multinational cor' porations has ' "2
contributed to the politicization of th-igsprocess Whi
international trade has always had.,pA]olt lai pitcatins,-
this aspect has increased tremendouslyas the re6su.t-bf " - "
mands for mobilization of alifo'rces'-for the iimpl'emn tat" on.
of exclusive community poJic es. !. -..7" -,, n -,
'' -6- *_ V # - UAl though nat ion-s tates have always, played a ci ilye.,' -
I ieving that it -is large enough .Jt'o',nflu-ence pri , b-y an In-
crease or decrese. in- -the. amontooods,?it-bffe fole r'ile."
W. Leeman, The'.Pice of..Midd&leEast..iJAn Es s ay? n O ftl icai,
Economy 8 (1962). On o. igopoly, practices see- generally ;.
i kdashi'" su.p note-24:, 'at 6 _67; R.- Low,The Economics of
Antitrust:, Competiti-on _a onopo~j4_T7TT 9 ) 4.o. s,,
"Money., Monopoly and,-the Contempo rary World Order,''2 enver
J. 972);' g p.. cGreor Pricig
Policies 5-8 ( 974); P.' S iosLabini, Oligopoly anl Tedhnical
Progress (1p62); M.. Shub i k, .Strategy- an.d .a rket:-&Structure,-
Conet -ion-,-Ol i gopo-ly-,---an' the Theory of Games (1959) ;.Sweezy,,.
"Demand underlCon-di t ions o.f. ,Oigopol.y,!.. 47,,J ... Pol. En 508
(1939);- E''.. Penrose, The' L'rie AI-ternati.onal- Firms-::i-h B e. op.-
i nq Coun i.6es F5 ( -andF a ,.The Ppo.liticai. Econ-om
ofMonopoly -- 1952).
*27. L .,Inh Thed Huma .1nteres't, B1174
'28'. For references to pol'it-ici-zatio'n"-of the"'cohiiodty- -
market see Trilateral-Comission,. Seeking A New Accommodation
in World: Commodity Market J C 9"6l;4-C0- nBergs ten, rmp lt-ing
the GATT: Toward New Internati,onaliRules .,to -Govern ExpdYt. Con-7t 'o , TT- _9 7 ::.. . :
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role in the pricing process, either directly or through their
corporations, at the present time their role takes on a new
importance. The effective participation of nation-states is
apparent not only in developing countries; but even in de-
veloped countries the trends point toward their domination.
Canada and Australia are examples of such developed coun-
tries. 29 Similar trends characterize the British, Scandi-
navian and Putch governments with respect to the operation of
the North Sea oil enterprise.3 0 The increase in state parti-
cipation has been recognized by multinational companies them-
selves. The president of Exxon, In the 1971 annual share-
holders' meeting stated that "[i]n the future, we will see
more of the government oil company, sometimes as a competitor
and sometimes as a partner . . . We recognize this develop-
ment as an element of changing times. We have learned to
live with such government policies and such government en-
tities." 3 1 Nevertheless, the important role of multinational
companies cannot be ignored. The major oil companies are
still responsible for approximately 80% of the world's oil
production outside the communist bloc, own and control 70% of
the total refining capacity, and through long-term charter,
control over 50% of the tonnage of international tankers.3 2
While U.S. government policy in 1974 promoted the establish-
ment of the International Energy Agency as a means of coopera-
tion among major consumer countries, Secretary of the Inter-
ior, Rogers Morton in an August 1973 address to the petroleum
industry stated that "[olur mission is to serve you, not regu-
late you . . . I pledge to you that the Department is at your
service."3 3 The strength of multinational companies is based
on their size, resources, "capacity to exploit economics of
scale, advanced technology, and know-how; their superior or-
ganizational and managerial ability and their unity of com-
29. For more on this trend see Mikdashl, supra note
24, at 20 n.3.
30. Id., at 20. See also 'When Are the British Like
The Arabs? W h'en it Comes to Developing a Major Natural Re-
source," in Forbes, June 15, 1973, at 88. Similar concern
has also been shown by European countries by restricting for-
eign capital, see Mikdashi, supra note 24, at 21, nn. 5,6 and
7.
31. Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1971, at 75.
32. A few years ago these figures were even higher.
P. Odell, Oil and World Power 11 (1975).
33. Bus. Week, July 13, 1974, at 8, quoted in Mikdashi,
supra note 24, at 41.
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mand; their extensive market outlets; their close interre-
latedness in partnerships and in other respects; and their
negotiating skills."3 4 But this strength of multinationals,
which formerly operated in their favor in bilateral agree-
ments with developing countries in the pricing process, is
being offset by the growing effective control of host govern-
ments over the process of resource use, and by the host-state
officials' improved skills in negotiation.
One may predict that In the future the role of the oil
companies will be limited primarily to providing the service,
organization, expertise necessary for exploitation, process-
ing, and perhaps transportation and marketing. "The role
once played by the companies in negotiating price and supply
must now devolve on the governments of the consuming coun-
tries." 35 One knowledgeable observer considers some of these
changes, such as conservation control, managerial training
and production quotas, to be effective in providing more
equitable value distribution.3 6
C. Basic Community Policies
1. Preferred Outcomes
In the contemporary interdependent world, in which most
important public decisions and private choices have multiple
value effects, policies regarding the pricing process must
take into account the impact upon the much larger canvas of
value productions and distributions. From the standpoint of
a disengaged observer, the pricing of resources may be one
strategy for the fulfillment of a broader policy of the opti-
mum production and fair and equitable distribution of human
dignity values. Pricing must be conceived, therefore, as an
integral part of an overall strategy for the protection of
common interests in the management of resources. While the
major value most immediately at stake in this process is
wealth, the production and distribution of other values are
also-ultimately and importantly at stake.36a For this reason,
34. Mikdashi, supra note 24, at 36; see also id. at
37-40.
35. Muir, "The Changing Legal Framework of Interna-
tional Energy Management," 9 Int'l Law. 605, 608 (1975).
36. Id. See also Levy, 'World Oil Cooperation or
Economic Chaos-," 52 Foreign Affairs Q. 690, 693-98 (1974).
36a. For the relation of wealth value to other values
see Polanyi, supra note 2, at 46.
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economic factors cannot be the only reference points for
pricing. In this respect, the theories about pricing, both
capitalist and Marxist, are too narrow, for they do not take
into account the new demands and expectations about the role
of pricing.
With the increasing threat of resource scarcity, one
goal of pricing should be to secure an appropriate rate of ex-
ploitation and conservation of resources at any particular
moment and through time. This goal raises important issues
that are ignored by the "classical capitalist" concept of
pricing. An appropriate concern for the future world supply
of resources may interfere with a free market economy. For
example, it is predicted that in the future the climate Is
going to deteriorate with effects on agricultural production
and particularly on grain production. This may require that
the United States resort to a policy of stockpiling of grain
in good harvest years against the inevitable bad years, es-
pecially since 90 percent of the global grain supply consumed
out of its continent of origin comes from North America.
Stockpiling is, however, against the United States policy of
a free market, since it tends to stabilize prices and control
profits.37
The effect of pricing policy on the distribution of
resources, and on the benefits of resource exploitation, must
be explicitly considered. Pricing policy should not be per-
mitted adversely to undermine the interests of a large group
of participants, especially the developing countries. Thus,
with respect to pricing policies concerning oil and wheat It
is generally acknowledged that the two groups of producers of
these commodities do not adequately take Into account the In-
terests of other countries.38 The governments of many oil-
37. See Schneider, "The Genesis Strategy" book review
by D. Sharpey-,N.Y. TImes "Book Review," July 18, 1976 at 3,
col. 4. One can also argue that sometimes even monopoly may
be necessary to make competition workable. Because In a
purely competitive market firms will have deficits when de-
mand fell below capaclity and this would bankrupt many Indus-
tries. Therefore, a degree of "Inelasticity" in demand (iden-
tified by some other writers with monopoly power) is needed
to make competition workable by allowing leeway for a flexible
price policy to cope with depressions." Clark, "Towards a
Concept of Workable Competition," 30 Am. Econ. Rev. 250 (1940),
quoted in C. Muller, Light Metals Monopoly 12 (1946).
38. "Oil and Wheat," Washington Post, reprinted In the
Int'l Herald Tribune Jan. 2, 1974, cited in Mikdashl, supra
note 24,at 73.
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consuming developing nations believe that the oil pricing sys-
tem has operated only to transfer wealth to oil producers,
with adverse impact on their own economies. They see a gap
growing between oil-exporting developing countries and oil-
consuming developing countries. 39 Oil-consuming developing
countries argue that the pricing policy of oil exporters has
adversely affected the consumption of oil necessary for in-
ternal development. Energy consumption has most rapidly in-
creased in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and recently in
Africa. In Malaysia and Brazil, the average annual rate of
growth of energy consumption oyer the last twenty years has
been approximately 12 percent. 4 0 The need of developing coun-
tries for energy in the early stages of growth is obvious.4 1
Brazil, with a population of 100 million in 1972 used only 50
million metric tons of coal, compared with the United King-
dom's population of 50 million and 325 million metric tons of
coal equivalent. In 1972 the developing nations outside the
communist bloc, and the major oil producers excepted, con-
sumed approximately 900 million metric tons, which was about
40 percent of the amount used in the United States in the
same year.42 The present oil pricing policy thus importantly
affects both the present distribution of benefits and the
potentialities of future growth.
Assessment of the costs of resource exploitation should
be comprehensive; the distribution of these costs should be
made in conformity to overall policy goals. This approach re-
quires the taking into account of such factors as damage to
the environment, injuries to workers, and all the other social
and other costs borne in production. When production imposes
costs upon non-consenting individuals and groups who are not
directly engaged in the process of production, a rational
pricing will assess and provide accommodation for such costs.
One important goal in pricing policy is that of bal-
ancing the n~ed for stability in expectations with that of
39. See Odell, supra note 32, at 93-137.
40. Td-.at 147.
41. The process of rapid increase in energy consump-
tion in the early stages of economic development is not new.
The experience of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the
United States and other currently industrialized countries
shows such trends. These countries generally satisfied their
energy requirements by domestic coal, in contrast with present
developing countries which have to import their energy needs.
Id. at 144.
42. Id.
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promoting appropriate changes toward preferred public order
goals. The stability of expectations to which we refer Is
necessary for the encouragement and maintenance of economic
and other activities. The process of pricing must, however,
be kept flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances.
With respect to primary products, "stability" in pricing js
too often referred to as prevention of decline in prices, 3
without regard for the potentialities that might inhere in a
raise in prices.
This policy of striking the balance between the needs
for stability and change finds expression in international
prescription. Principle 10 of the Stockholm Conference
states: "For the developing countries, stability of prices
and adequate earnings for primary commodities and raw mater-
ials are essential to environmental management since economic
factors a well as ecological processes must be taken Into
account.3 44 This concern has been expressed further In the
1967 Resolution 239 of the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development:
Considering the decisive importance of the
stabilization of prices of primary products
at a remunerative level for the economic
advancement of the developing countries and
the Improvement of the standard of living of
their populations, the Governors' meeting in
Dakar request that an RIO study be made of
the conditions in which IMF, IBRD and IDA
could participate in the elaboration of suit-
able mechanisms involving balanced commit-
ments on the part both of the producing and
of the consuming countries, and devote the
necessary resources thereto.45
43. For the history of price fluctuation over some
700 years, see Brown & Hopkins, "Seven Centuries of the Pelces
of Consumables, Compared with Builders' Wagerales," Economica,
Nov. 1956, cited in Cane, supra note 16 at 10. For the de-
cline of price of commodity products through 1962 see Cane,
supra note 16, at 9.
44. The Stockholm Conference, 9 Int'l Legal Mat. 1419
(1972).
45. IMF & IBRD, The Problem of Stabilization of Prices
of Primary Products 1 (1969). Similarly IMF Resolution 22-9
recognized the importance of price stabilization of primary
products. This concern led to a joint study by these two in-
ternational organizations as to stabilization problems. Id.
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A joint study by IMF and IBRD has demonstrated that be-
cause of the heavy dependence of developing countries on pri-
mary products for their earnings, the range of prices and
trading opportunities in the world commodities markets have
important consequences for all of their internal value pro-
cesses. 4 6 The joint study examining the market structures
shows that while the prices of some of the commodities have
been slow to increase, or have been decreasing, there has
been a tendency for the over-production of a number of com-
modities, such as coffee, cocoa, tea, sugar, bananas, cotton
and hard fibers. The study emphasizes, furthermore, that
serious fluctuation in the price of commodities from develop-
ing countries has been two and a half to three times larger
than those from industrial countries. The demand of develop-
ing countries for stabilization in the price of commodities
has been attacked by some developed countries. Nevertheless,
the developed countries themselves have taken measures to
support or stabilize their own markets.47 Before the UNCTAD
meeting of 1964 the Economist described the trade crisis in
the third world:
The underdeveloped countries, poor as they
are, have been contributing, involuntarily,
to western prosperity. Since the early
fifties the volume of food and agricul-
tural products exported has risen by about
a third. But in value they have increased
by only a sixth and the rise in the price
of manufactures has wiped out even that
small gain. 4 8
46. Id. The problem with the world market, however, is
that its capacity for using these materials has grown slowly.
Any increase comes at the expense of low prices. Furthermore,
there are wide fluctuations in the prices of commodities. The
decrease, or slow increase, in demand for primary products is
a result also of technological development in synthetics and
changes in consumption patterns. The study indicates that
world trade in agricultural products has been held back be-
cause of the policy of industrialized countries to protect
their own products. The joint study further showed that trends
in the increase of some primary commodities are, however, di-
vergent. Market for some primaries such as petroleum, timber,
iron ore and bauxite have shown rapid growth since World War
II. Some other commodities such as rubber, cotton, wool, jute
and hard fibers have been facing serious competition from syn-
thetics.
47. See UNCTAD Proceedings: Commodity Trade Vol. 111 at
48. The Economist, Jan. 12, 1963, at 131, cited in
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Whether or not the price fluctuations of commodities
damage the growth of developing countries has caused some de-
bate among economists. MacBean argues that the damage from
short-term instability of price of commodities in developing
countries has been over-emphasized. There is not much evi-
dence, he asserts, to show an interrelation between price
fluctuation and damage, or that changes in the income of de-
veloping couptries clearly relate to price fluctuations in
commodities.4 9 Similarly, another observer, studying the
Chilean economy, notes that he could not find any clear rela-
tionship between stability of export earnings and growth.50
Yet, contrary to these arguments and findings, a number of
economists have observed a negative impact of price fluc-
tuation on under-development. Professor Myrdal, for example,
observes that:
The basic causes of export instability and the
reasons it is so significant lies essentially
in the nature of under-development itself.
Under-developed countries have only a limited
ability to adjust supply to demand, an ex-
port list composed of one or a few major
products, often a relatively high ratio of
exports to national income, and a rapidly
growing total of Import needs; thus they are
sensitive and extremely vulnerable to vari-
ations In export proceeds.51
The latter argument has been supported by most economlsts.Sla
The adverse effects upon the growth of the developing
countries would often appear to be functions both of a rela-
tive decline in the price of primary commodities and of a
Hager, "Commodity Agreements and Developing CountrIes--A Col-
lective Bargaining Approach," 7 Int'l Law. 309, 316 (1973).
See also W. Lewis, Some Aspects of Economic Development 15
(1970) and Barraclough, "The Haves and the Have Nots," The
New York Rev. of Books, May 13, 1976, 31, 36, col. 2.
49. A. MacBean, Export Instability and Economic De-
velopment 339- 6, clted in Hager at 314.
50. Reynolds, "Domestic Consequences of Export Insta-
bility," 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 100 (1963), cited in Hager, supra
note 48, at 314.
51. G. Myrda., 3 Asian Drama 2200 (1968). See also
Meier, "UNCTAD Proposals for International Economic Reform,"
19 Stan. L. Rev. 1185, 1186 (1967); I. Little & J. Clifford,
International Aid 155 (1966); W. Haviland, International Com-
modity Agreements 52 (1963).
51a. See note 51 supra.
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relative increase in the price of manufactured goods. Be-
cause of such interdependency, the pricing of all commodities
should be contextually interrelated. The concept of an in-
dexing system embodies this policy. Where the prices of a
large number of important commodities, primary and manufac-
tured, are important to both developed and developing coun-
tries, an appropriate indexing may promote pricing in the
common interest. This policy rejects the concept of case-by-
case (single-item) pricing as a general guide. The case-by-
case system tends to neglect the function of pricing as a
strategy of allocating values; its emphasis is only upon eco-
nomic factors such as the costs of production, efficiency,
etc. In other words, the case-by-case system approach to
pricing is too restrictive for today's required function of
pricing.
The overall policies we recommend may require price
differentiation when it contributes to optimum internal value
processes. Price differentiation is a part of the General
Scheme of Preferences (GSP).5 2a The practice of granting
preferences in trade is not new to international commercial
activities. Historic examples Include the Commonwealth Im-
perial Preferences, French Union Preferences, the Benelux Union
of Preferences, the United States Preferences with the Philip-
pines, etc.52 These bilateral preferences were continued
after World War II, later being replaced by multilateral trade
agreements such as Article I of GATT, EEC practices53 and the
Lome Convention. A system of preferences was promoted by
UNCTAD in 1968 in a resolution that requested UNCTAD to
Establish to this end, a Special Committee on
Preferences, as a subsidiary organ of the Trade
and Development Board, to enable all countries
concerned to participate in necessary consulta-
tions . . . [and]
Requested that the aim shall be to settle details
of the arrangements in the course of 1969 with a
view to seeking legislative authority and re-
quired waiver in GATT as soon as possible there-
after.54
52. Nabudere, "The Third World and Generalized Schemes
of Preferences," 7 E. Afr. L. Rev. 293 (1974).
52a. The Generalized System of Preferences obtained Con-
gressional approval in the Trade Reform Act of 1974. See
Stern, "The Accommodation of Interests Between Developed-and
Developing Countries," 10 J. World Trade 405, 106 (1976).
53. Supra note 52, at 294.
54. Resolution 21(11) Proceedings, New Delhi, Vol. 1,
at 38 (1968).
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In practice, however, this system was not received favorably
by the oil-producing developing countries. OPEC members re-
fused to establish price differentiation between oil-importing
developing and developed countries because of the difficulties
of sealing markets and the possibility of black markets. OPEc
tried to compensate and replace price differentiation by
grants and credits, which proved to be insufficient.
Dumping is one mode of price differentiation. With re-
gard to industrial goods, contemporary policy against dumping
as between Industrial competitors has been effected by use of
countervailing duties. Dumping as a strategy for incapaci-
tating primary producers does not appear, however, to have
stimulated appropriate inclusive prescription. From the stand-
point of goal clarification, optimum community order would ap-
pear to be secured by a more supple set of guidelines. The
recommended policies promote the contextual use of price dif-
ferentiation to secure all more fundamental community goals.
As consistently emphasized, we recommend a disciplined, con-
figurative consideration of the consequences of different
prices at different times in different contexts. This policy
would prohibit differential pricing which weakens or destroys
inclusively demanded development; yet it would promote differ-
ential pricing which contributes to the realization of de-
manded development plans.
One Important function of pricing, as mentioned earlier,
is the distribution of values not necessarily arising from some
particular exploitation of resources. This function may re-
quire pricing practices whose effects can only be assessed con-
textually. In general, it Is suggested that alternative pric-
ing practices be evaluated in terms of their aggregate value
and public order effects. These alternative pricing modali-
ties may involve varying degrees of "economic coercion," im-
plemented through high prices of commodities and goods, boy-
cott, cutbacks in production, or embargo. These practices are
available not only to producers but also to consumers. While
general community prescriptions oppose these alternative pric-
ing systems, there has been a long history of such practices.
The position we take, however, is that the ultimate outcomes
of alternative pricing systems on aggregate value distribution
and public order goals is the appropriate test of the legiti-
macy of such pricing policies.
2. Allocation of Competence
The most important--i.e., urgent and controverslal--
issue in a constitutive process about pricing relates to the
participants in the pricing process. The most general policy
we recommend is that all who are affected by the prices of re-
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sources and commodities should both have competence to parti-
cipate In the pricing process, and be made responsible to the
more inclusive community decision. This means that both pro-
ducers and consumers be made responsible participants. Cate-
gorization of participants in these terms is, however, rather
artificial; most communities are both producers and consumers,
the producers of some commodities being the consumers of other
commodities and vice versa. In the present practices of inter-
national trade, countries tend to categorize themselves into
these two groups on different commodities in the hope of bet-
ter securing their interests.
The policy we recommend is for wider representation of
both producers and consumers in the pricing process. With re-
spect to vital resources, that is, resources whose use has wide
inclusive impact, the competence to appraise prices should be
as inclusive and representative as possible. This policy would
promote the participation not only of governments but also of
private associations such as corporations in the pricing process.
Private associations can perform useful and important functions
in terms of intelligence, promotion, and even application of
pricing policies.
With respect to primary products, primary producers might
be accorded an initial competence to set prices subject to re-
view. This initial competence for primary producers might be
honored because of their total or high dependence on a single
commodity. This preliminary preference for primary producers
may also be justified because they can have no control over a
number of other factors related to the ultimate value of their
commodities In developed countries. Such factors include the
future real growth of production and income in the industrial
countries, changes in taste of consumers, competition by syn-
thetic materials, etc., which affect the demands for and the
prices of their commodities.
The policies we recommend promote the effective parti-
cipation of those most affected by the pricing process. Some-
times, to make their participation more effective, partici-
pants with little power may organize as groups in an effort to
deal more as equals with market forces. Such participation has
been promoted in the practices by developing countries as well
as in the search for new international and national prescrip-
tions. Some of these groups are referred to as producers'
associations. While such associations in formal and organized
form have been established by producers of raw materials for
several decades, consumer countries are also familiar with com-
parable practices through their corporations and informal ar-
rangements between governments. The establishment of opposing
associations by consumers has been condemned by producers.
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Producers justify their own associations as the only strat-
egy that can put them on a more equal footing with the con-
sumers in pricing processes. They regard, therefore, any at-
tempt by consumers to organize themselves as destroying fair
representation.
A preferred policy might be to promote the practices
of producers' associations. The functions of these associ-
ations are quite extensive: they are not only a means for
equalizing the power basis of producers and consumers in the
present market structure, but also they perform useful in-
telligence, promotion, prescription and application functions
among the producers, who have limited ability singly to reach
these results. Questions about lawfulness or unlawfulness
should, accordingly, be related not to the existence of the
producers' associations as a totality, but rather to their
particular practices in the exercise of their newly-found
power.
The well-being of the people of the world cannot of
course be left to the unilateral discretion of a single bloc
of countries, whether they are developed or developing, pro-
ducers or consumers. Freedom of choice and representation in
the process of decision-making must be overriding goals in a
preferred world public order of human dignity. Any hegemony
which destroys this freedom must be condemned as latter-day
imperialism, whether it is by producers or consumers. The
traditional "free market" in world commodities has never ade-
quately protected this freedom of choice. It is conceivable,
however, that a contemporary global constitutive process might
be able to achieve a balancing between inclusive and exclu-
sive competences, as well as the procedures for careful, con-
textual evaluation in particular instances of decision, which
could enhance that freedom.
D. Trends in Decision
Pricing, in the sense that we employ the term, is a
technique of social control for regulating timing, location,
etc. as well as allocating benefits and values In the ex-
ploitation of resources. This technique embraces a whole
range of options from consensual to administered or coercive
arrangements and exhibits many differing degrees of govern-
ment involvement. It has always been used, though not always
effectively or rationally, to promote the policies of the
effective decision-makers in a community. The tolerance on
the part of the effective participants in the world constitu-
tive process in according differing degrees of exclusive or
inclusive competence in states about pricing has varied with
particular situations. The type of pricing policy protected
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within communities commonly described in terms of "monopoly"
and "competition," existed more than 4,000 years ago in
Babylon.5 5  In practice, however, '1onopoly" and "competition"
seldom represent accurate descriptions of pricing practice;
they express the extremes from the most limited to the widest
participation. Pricing is an activity which, as indicated,
may be left to "market" accommodation with varying degrees of
governmental participation, or may be highly governmentalized
within a community. Though private and governmental partici-
pation in pricing have varied greatly throughout history, to-
day, on a global scale, governmental participation In pricing
is increasing. Moreover, the more comprehensive constitu-
tive process of authoritative decision is becoming increasing-
ly explicit in its establishment and protection of exclusive,
partially inclusive, and inclusive competences with regard to
pricing.
1. Exclusive Competence Over Pricing
By exclusive competence55a as to pricing we refer to
the competence of any particular nation-state to make and ap-
ply laws about the pricing of the goods and services which are
produced through the exploitation of its internal resources.
55. Machlup, supra note 27 at 181.
55a. The terms inclusive and exclusive may be employed
to refer to every feature both of the process of decision and
of the process of use by which resources are exploited. For
an exposition of this terminology see M. McDougal, H. Lasswell,
& I. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space 153-157 (1963). The
references are intended to be descriptive only, not preferen-
tial.
By inclusive competence we refer to a process of de-
cision exhibiting multiple participants. When we add the ad-
jective "partially," we note specialized characteristics of
the participants which may preclude a full representation of
interests. Thus, an organized process of decision, such as
OPEC, though including multiple participants, may be consti-
tuted only of producers and not consumers. When an organized
process of decision admits representation of all interests as
in commodity agreements, the adjective "partially" is not em-
ployed.
It is recognized, of course, that while a process of de-
cision may be inclusive in terms of the number of participants
who play a role in the making and applying of law, the out-
comes of the decisions taken may or may not be inclusive in
their impact. They may be exclusive in their impact and even
detrimental to larger inclusive interests, such as the in-
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The officials of a nation-state may of course themselves
directly participate in pricing activities either alone or
in collaboration with various private participants. Con-
versely, private participants may play a role in the making
of law through their cooperative activity which creates ex-
pectations about authority and control. In the relative ab-
sence of inclusive prescriptions limiting the exclusive com-
petence of the state, it has commonly been assumed that the
competence of particular states is comprehensive and largely
unfettered. This assumption would appear to be confirmed
both by historic practice and by contemporary inclusive pro-
nouncements.
Yet, however broad their competence, nation-states
have not effectively regulated the practices of their cor-
porations and other enterprises in the pricing process. This
lack of effective regulation has stemmed from a number of fac-
tors, e.g. conceptions about the relevance of governmental
participation, economic activities, contending political and
other ideologies and appropriate exercise of state competence.
The actual decisions about price determination have been made
mainly by private enterprise. Private corporations, commonly
in groups, have effectively controlled the pricing process.
Historically, their practices have been known as cartels.5 6
terests of a larger number of states or of the aggregate com-
munity. Our terminology is designed for the more precise
description of such differences, in the hope of promoting a
more rational clarification of community policy.
56. For references to cartels see Cheney, Cartels,
Combines and Trusts (1944); International Cart-els (League of
Nations Memorandum) 10-12 (1947); Hearings before the Tempor-
ary National Economic Committee, Congress of the United
States, 76th Cong. 3rd sess. Investigation of Concentration
of Economic Power (1940) pt. 25; Edwards (ed.), A Cartel Pol-
icy for the United Nations (1945); Report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Restrictive Business Practices, UN Doc. E/2380,
E/AC.37/3 (1953); E. Hexner, International Cartels (1945);
A. Plummer, International Combines in Modern Industry (1951);
G. Stocking & M. Walkins, Cartels or Competition? (1948);
Foreign Legislation Concerning Monopoly and Cartel Practices
(82d Cong. 2d sess. 1952); F. Machup, supra note 27;
K. Pribram, Cartel Problems (1935 ; A. Gordon, The Problem of
Trust and Monopoly (1928); H. Kronstein, The Law of Interna-
tional Cartels (1973); C. Edwards, Control of Cartels and
Monopolies: An International Comparison (1967); N. Medvin,
The Energy Cartel: Who Runs the American Oil Industry (1974);
Streeten, "The Dynamics of the New Poor Power," In G. Helleiner
supra note 21, at 77-88.
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The word "cartel" was first used by the German Reichstag to
refer to monopolistic activity,5 7 and the concept was later
developed more comprehensively for opposing a policy of com-
petition.58 While both "cartel" and "monopoly" generally re-
fer to the same types of practices, historically the latter
was the term first used to imply the economic exploitation of
poor by rich.5 9 The term "cartel" has now acquired a nega-
tive connotation associated again with the domination of the
"have-nots" by the "haves." 60 The connotations implied as
well as the explicitness of the terminology of course affects
all its uses. This may explain why the League of Nations in
referring to cartels used the phrase "industrial agree-
ments,''61 while the United Nations employs "restrictive busi-
ness practices." The changes in terms for describing exclu-
sive participation in the pricing process may have no sub-
stantial impact upon the structure and practice of the Institu-
tion, but may reflect an attempt to change its objective or to
change prior assessments of unlawfulness.
In cartels, private, governmental, or mixed enterprises
seek to dominate markets by agreement. Thus, cartels are de-
fined as "voluntary agreements among independent enterprises
in a single industry or closely related industries with the
purpose of exercising a monopolistic control of the market.",62
Similarly, Edward Mason defines cartels thus:
Cartels, in the narrow--and proper--sense,
are agreements between firms with respect
to the production and marketing of their
products. Typically, cartel agreements
aim at the restriction of output or sales
by the member firms, at an allocation of
market territories between firms, and a
fixing of the price of their products. 63
The expansion of the cartel practices from marketing agree-
57. Hexner, supra note 56, at 3.
58. Pribram, supra note 56, at 6.
59. F. Haussmann & D. Ahearn, International Cartels
and World Trade, An Explanatory Note reprinted from THOUGHT,
19 Ford U. L.Q. 421, 430 (1944).
60. The New York Times has noted that the word cartel
has become a pejorative label. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1943,
at 16 quoted in Hexner, supra note 56, at 7.
61. Hexner, supra note 59, at 8.
62. League ofNations, International Cartels, supra
note 56, at I.
63. E. Mason, Economic Concentration and Monopoly
Problem 73 (1957).
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ments to patents and process exchange agreements between firms
in different countries has often been noted.6 4 Hexner, empha-
sizing market manipulations, defines a cartel as a "voluntary,
potentially impermanent, business relationship among a number
of independent, private entrepreneurs, which through coordi-
nated marketing significantly affects the market of a commod-
ity or service."65 Fritz Machlup refers to cartels as
"M[business arrangements which have the purpose or effect of
reducing or regulating competition."6 6 The League of Nations
emphasizing the objectives, offered this definition:
Cartels are associations of independent under-
takings in the same or similar branches of in-
dustry established by a view to improving
conditions of production and sale. 67
Despite all the negative connotations of "cartel" and "monop-
oly," both economic writers and, upon occasion, authors of
Inclusive prescriptions have offered a more objective apprais-
al of their purposes. Thus, Karl Pribram has said that the
effects of cartels "favorable or prejudicial--upon the pro-
duction and distribution of goods, upon the general economic
structure, and upon the distribution of income are variously
assessed."6 8 Again, the World Economic Conference of 1927
(Geneva), referring to cartels, stated:
The phenomenon of such agreements, arising
from economic necessities, does not consti-
tute a matter upon which any conclusions of
principles need be reached, but a develop-
ment which has to be recognized and which
from its practical point of view must be con-
sidered as good or bad according to the spirit
which rules the constitution and the operation
of the agreements, and in particular according
to the measures in which those directing them
are actuated by a sense of general interest. 69
Another writer, referring to the objectives and ultimate im-
pact of cartels on the common interest, has said:
64. Id. at 74.
65. Hexner, supra note 56 at 24. See also Stocking
and Watkins, supra note 56, at 3; Arnold, "Cartels or Free
Enterprises?" Public Affairs Pamphlet no. 103 at 5 (1945).
66. Machlup, supra note 56, at 3.
67. Haussmann & Ahearn, s note 59, at l0.
68. Primbram, supra note 56, at 1.
69. Haussmann & Ahearn, supra note 59, 1at"422.
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Thus the monopolist has power for good
or ill; he may turn to productive uses
energies formerly absorbed in the com-
petitive struggle; or he may drift,
through security and the power of ex-
tortion, into wasteful and absolute
methods of production.70
Finally, Kronstein insists that It is only the malevolent, or
unique kind of cartel which has the purpose "to discriminate
against, or to exclude from the market, a specific enterprise,
whereas in other types of cartels the discrimination or ex-
clusion is only a device to accomplish a regulation of the
market ."71
The trends in practice concerning cartels, as with most
social institutions, establish clearly that final judgment on
cartels should be based mainly upon ultimate consequences for
value production and distribution and the degree of conformity
to or deviation from community goals. In general, however, it
may be said that private cartels have not left a good record
in this respect. The pricing processes with respect to raw
materials, and particularly oil resources, have never been
competitive. There has always been a deliberate control of
supply, with determination of price level, by international
oil companies.72  Contrary to the assertions of the oil com-
panies, the non-competitive nature of this industry has been
generally recognized. Leeman and Mikdashi emphasize that the
joint approaches and vertical integration among oil companies
diminished competition;7 3 hence, neither demand nor su ply has
been particularly responsive to the "price mechanism."/7
The idea of comprehensive control over oil resources
began with the multinational oil companies. All the leading
70. Id. Mason observes that the primary objective of
cartels is to increase prices by restricting participation
and competition. Cartels would no longer continue, he ob-
serves, If "prices and output under cartelization were not
more satisfactory to participating members than they could be
with competition." Mason, supra note 69 at 78. See also
B. Wallace & L. Edminster, International Control oTk Mater-
ials 17-25 (1930).
71. Kronstein, supra note 56 at 142-143.
72. For the description of early control of supply of
oil by oil companies see, E. Penrose, supra note 26 at 150-175.
73. Mikdashi, supra note 24 at 70; Leeman, supra note
26 at 6-44.
74. I. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments 117
(1962).
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companies were involved at one time or another in the promo-
tion of this idea. The most active participants, however,
were Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Shell, and Anglo-
Persian. But monopoly control over oil resources was not
accomplished immediately. In the beginning the companies were
too busy expanding the industry and meeting the rapid growth
in demand, which more than doubled between 1919 and 1926.75
In several countries the companies had price fixing agreements
which were not taken entirely seriously.76 In the late 1920's,
the major oil companies realized that price competition was
not profitable to any of them and should be avoided in the
future. In order to organize the joint pricing policies of
the oil companies, secret conferences were sponsored through
the summer of 1929. The conclusive meeting at Achnacarry
Home brought about an agreement for setting up an internation-
al oil cartel. 77 With the official title of the Pool Asso-
ciation of September 17, 1928, though usually called the
Achnacarry Agreement, this agreement covered the pricing pro-
cess over the entire world outside the United States and the
Soviet Union. 7 8 It required a quota system for each market
and a formula for price fixing. To implement the agreement
two American export associations were set up to allocate the
total American quota among various companies involved. One
was the Standard Oil Export Corporation formed In December
1928, which consisted of Jersey Standard and five of its sub-
sidiaries. The second was the Export Petroleum Association,
Inc. formed in early 1929, which Included Standard Oil Export
Corporation and 16 other major American exporters. 79 Standard
was a link between the American and the European Industries. 80
A "Gulf plus" system was agreed on as the basis for
pricing. Under this system, the price of oil should be the
same in every export center throughout the world as in the
American ports along the Gulf of Mexico. The final cost at
the delivery point, however, depended upon its distance from
the Gulf of Mexico and on whether or not the buyer was a mem-
ber of the cartel. 8 1 This system required the customer oil
75. C. Tugendhat & A. Hamilton, Oil: The Biggest Busi-
ness 97 (rev. ed. 1975).
76. Id. at 98.
77. Federal Trade Commission, The International Petro-
leum Cartel 198-199 Lhereinafter cited as Federal Trade Com-
mission].
78. For an outline of the agreement see id. at 200.
See also R. Engler, The Politics of Oil 70-72 (1l9").
79. See note 77,supra at 202.
80. Id.
81. Tugendhat & Hamilton, supra note 75, at 102.
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companies outside the cartel to pay the Gulf price plus the
cost of shipping the oil from the United States to the point
of delivery. It made no difference if the supply came from
a field closer to the destination than that of the Gulf of
Mexico. In such situations, extra profits went to the cartel.
Obviously, the Gulf pricing system did not take into account
the interest of consumers whose oil was shipped from a near-
er port; its basic objective was the maximization of the
profit of the cartel members. It has been observed that the
reason for such a pricing system was that major oil com-
panies had their principal assets invested in the United
States. The United States was the major oil producer in the
1930s and 1940s and therefore, it was to its benefit to main-
tain the largest possible market for American oil. Thus, the
higher prices for the Middle East oil not only did not hurt
the American oil because it had the same price, but also
secured more profits for the cartel because the prices were
significantly higher than the cost of transportation. 82
At the same time as the Pool Association in 1929, there
was a similar attempt to control production and lessen com-
petition in the United States. This attempt did n t succeed
because the Attorney General refused to cooperate.93 From
1930 until the Second World War three other agreements on con-
trol of the pricing process similar to Achnacarry Principles
were agreed upon, such as the 1930 Memorandum for European
Markets, 1932 Heads of Agreements for Distribution and the
1934 Draft Memorandum of Principles.8 4 The latter was made in
great secrecy and only the most senior officials were allowed
to know all the plan's details. This agreement covered all
countries outside North America. A central committee was
established in London to control the operation by making sep-
arate agreements for each particular market and encouraging
other companies to join them.85 This exclusive control over
pricing was not entirely successful. Its proponents could not
persuade all companies to join in order to get the major por-
tion of control. The majors further had difficulty at times in
accommodating the policies of their subsidiaries in different
countries. Above all, governments have become increasingly in-
volved in the oil pricing process. 8 6 The elimination of formal
cartel agreements among oil companies came after World War I1.
82. Id. at 104.
83. Fe-deral Trade Commission, supra note 77, at 210-211.
84. Id. at 228-268.
85. Tugendhat & Hamilton, supra note 75 at 109-111.
86. Id.
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Nonetheless, their control over oil supplies and their In-
formal mutual understanding and consensus about pricing pol-
icy to maximize their own profits remained.87
The actual structure of the oil industry outside the
United States reached its present state in the late 1940's
and early 1950's, when the political and economic Influence
of the United States was unchallenged, thanks in part to the
cooperatlon between the State Department and the oil com-
panies.6o Through this mutual cooperation, the seven majors
owned 65% of the world's estimated crude oil reserves and
controlled more than 92% of the estimated crude reserves out-
side the United States, Mexico and Russia in 1949.89 In the
same year the seven majors accounted for more than one-half
of the world's crude production excluding Russia and satel-
lite countries, about 96% of the production in the Eastern
Hemisphere and about 45% in the Western Hemisphere.90 In 1950
the crude oil refining capacity of the world was also largely
controlled by the seven majors. They controlled about 57% of
the world's crude oil refining capacity, held more than 75%
in the Western Hemisphere excluding the United States and held
77% of the rest of the world's crude oil refinery capacity.91
Control over the cracking process in oil production is
more important economically than control over crude oil re-
fining. Cracking is a process by which heavy hydrocarbons are
broken up by heat into lighter products, yielding a greater
quantity of more highly-valued products and produces many of
the chemicals which are the basic raw materials for synthetic
rubber and many plastics. This process, therefore, makes the
petroleum industry an important supplier of products for other
industries, and control over this process affects a broader
segment of the world economy than control over refining.92 In
1950 the control of the seven major oil companies over the
cracking process was stronger than their control over the re-
fining process. The majors owned 47% of the United States'
cracking capacity, 53% of the Western Hemisphere's, 84% of the
Eastern Hemisphere's and 55% of the total world's.9 3 Excluding
87. Odell, supra note 32 at 15.
88. T. Rifai, The Pricing of Crude Oil 3 (1974). See
also A. Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies
and the World they Made 185-207 (1975).
89. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 77, at 23.
90. Id. at 24.
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the United States, the USSR and its satellites, the seven
majors held 85% of all cracking capacity of the rest of the
world and 77% of the crude-refining capacity.94
The control of transportation of oil resources was al-
so long concentrated in the seven major oil companies. They
owned more than 50% of the world's tanker fleet in 1950,95
and all of the important pipelines outside the United States.96
In a study by the United States Federal Trade Commission, it
is stated that in no Industry is the control over marketing
as concentrated as it is in the oil industry.9 7 The study
notes that it is "a rule, rather than the exception, for petro-
leum products to move from producer to consumer by company-
owned facilities within one corporate hierarchy.' 8
The effective control of the major oil companies over
the process of use of oil resources was promoted through in-
tegration by contracts or joint ownership. For example, in
the 1960 oil consortium operating in Iran, five of the member
companies were shareholders of companies operating in Iraq,
four in Saudi Arabia, and two with special contracts Involving
94. Id. at 26.
95. Id. at 27.
96. Td. For the importance of petroleum pipelines
outside the United States see World Petroleum, Apr. 1950, at
63, cited in Id. at 28.
97. Sura note 77 at 280-348.
98. Id. at 28; the report states that:
[Clontrol of the industry by these seven com-
panies [Standard Oil Co. of California, Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., Gulf Oil Corp., and the
Texas Co.,--and two British-Dutch companies--
Anglo-iranian Oil Co., Litd., and the Royal
Dutch-Shell group] extends from reserves,
through production, transportation, refining,
and marketing. All seven engage in every
stage of operations, from exploration to
marketing. The typical movement of petroleum
from producer until acquired by the final con-
sumer is through inter-company transfer within
a corporate family. Out-right sales, arms-
length bargaining, and other practices charac-
terlstic of independent buyers and sellers are
conspicuous by their absence. Control is held
through direct corporate holdings, by parents,
subsidiaries, and affiliates of the seven, but
also through such indirect means as interlock-
ing directorates, joint ownership of affiliates'
intercompany crude purchase contracts, and
marketing agreements.
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three of the others In Kuwait. 99 Joint operation in produc-
tion is only one kind of integration. Integration in the
refining, marketing and transportation processes is equally
important. 100
The effective exclusive control of the oil companies
is known to have led to abuse of their power over pricing
process, as well as to the promotion of unjustifiable politi-
cal and other special interests of the companies and their
home governments.10 1 The companies' reduction of oil prices
in 1959 and 1960, for example, was interpretated as their
sanction against Venezuela's Imposition of additional taxes
on concessionary profits and as a strategy to influence the
outcomes of the claims and controversies between Iraq and the
Iraqi Petroleum Company.102 The 1951 boycott by the oil com-
panies of Iranian oil because of the nationalization of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, is another example of such abuse
of their exclusive control. The effective power of the major
oil companies over pricing not only excluded the authority and
control of the producers for participation in this process,
but also excluded any opportunity for increasing numbers of
oil consumers to have any say In the process.
India was one of the exceptional countries able to par-
ticipate in price adjustments on its Imported oil. The op-
portunity for India became available through support by the
Soviet Union of an Indian position. The oil companies while
providing India with Persian Gulf oil, charged It on the Gulf
price basis. India, a poor developing country, had no other
choice but to accept that unilateral pricing policy until 1960,
when the Soviet Union offered it to sell oil at prices which
were 20% less than the delivered price of Middle East oil of-
fered by the majors. As a result of this offer from the
Soviet Union, and in addition to the establishment of a nation-
al oil company, the Indian government demanded lower oil prices
99. Hartshorn, supra note 74, at 152.
100. id. at 117,52. In 1960 in United Kingdom, The
Republic of Ireland, the Near East, many African territories,
Ceylon, Shell and BP engaged in joint marketing and occasion-
ally in joint refining as sheil-Mex and BP; Standard of Cali-
fornia and the Texas Company did so in most countries of the
Eastern Hemisphere as Caltex. Until the end of 1960 Jersey
and Mobil also worked together in Africa. Id. at 153.
101. See M. Tanzer, The Political Eco-nomy of the Oil
Industry (199T.
102. D. Hirst, Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle
East 43 (1966).
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from the oil companies. 10 3 After the threat by the government,
the oil companies decreased the price of oil and since then
there have been several adjustments in prices. The Indian
government, however, is one of the very few exceptions among
the developing consuming countries that have been able to
participate In the pricing of oil Imports.
The major oil companies, the most effective partici-
pants In the pricing process, at least until 1971, have always
avoided a constructive and rational study about how and on
what basis this process operates. While this lack of informa-
tion is ostensibly about the international market, it exists
even within the United States national oil industry itself:
Even inside the American oil industry, which
has the most elaborate price reporting and
statistical series of any oil business in
the world, it is not easy to get rational dis-
cussion of the way in which these prices are
in fact formed. In the United States, the
spectre of antitrust proceedings broods over
any such discussion, and Its shadow extends
wherever in the world American companies oper-
ate. Even so, it is notable and unfortunate
that up to now, most International oil com-
panies, In particular, have left almost all
the serious discussion of price formation in
the international oil business to their
critics--usually contenting themselves with
the claim that oil pricing is the result of
"competition," naively defined.1 04
While there may be some competition between the oil companies
in the United States market, the competition referred to is
not In pricing. This kind of competition, known as "non-
price" competition, refers to competition at the refining
stage for research and production of more complicated and
lucrative products .1O5
103. Odeli, supra note 32, at 149.
104. Hartshorn, supra note 74, at 128.
105. Hartshorn states that one of the characteristics
of "non-price" competition Is the use of advertising to ex-
press the goodwill and interest of the oil companies in the
well-being of their customers and the claims for new and bet-
ter products. It is actually competitive In quality:
It steadily helps to increase the technical ef-
ficiency with which the consumer can use the fuel,
though sometimes at a significant cost in the tech-
nical efficiency with which the refinery that pro-
duces the fuel is run. It gives the consumer high-
er quality at the same price without offering him
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Cartel practices are common, not only in primary
products, but also in industrial products. Some of the im-
portant operating cartels between the two world wars Involved
such products. The role and objective of these cartels be-
tween the two world wars and after World War II were quite
different. The primary objective of the cartels between the
wars was the prevention of decline in prices, production and
sales.lOG After World War II, however, these cartels served,
in the words of one writer, "either as a bridge during a
transition period of technological or economic development
or as a means to protect large investments against the flow
of further dynamic development. . . . [Elvery further disin-
tegration of world markets, as the result of the balance-of-
payments or similar political economic reasons, encourages
new steps toward industrial products cartels."107 In March
1969, for example, after a negotiation between the United
States government and European and Japanese steel producers,
an agreement was concluded for a voluntary export quota for
1969.108 Another example of this kind of cartel is the car-
tel of the producers of fertilizer. In 1962, Nitrex, a Euro-
pean export association, was established to deal with Ameri-
can and Japanese competition.10 9 This association, however,
has not been successful in price stabilization. After study-
ing the role of corporations in the pricing of manufactures
and semi-manufactures of developing countries, UNCTAD con-
cluded that their role involved:
(a) The fixing of prices for particular markets
of the products exported and imported;
(b) Collusive tendering in respect of import
tenders called by developing countries; that
the choice of the same quality at a lower
price, which sets up a kind of technocratic
criterion, and tells the customer what is
best for him.
Id. at 156. This kind of competition In marketing Is backed
by a considerable amount of non-price competition at a fur-
ther in the integrated operations of the industry.
106. Kronstein, supra note 56, at 119.
107. Id.
108. ee The Economist Jan. 18, 1969, at 68-69, cited
at id., 120. This agreement was concluded because of the Amer-
ican threat of mandatory import quota legislation.
109. See C. Edwards, Cartelizatlon in Western Europe
(1964), cited in Kronstein (ed.), at 127. For more of this
kind of cartel see id. at 119-141.
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is, agreements as to who will trade, in
what amounts, and what prices;
(c) Allocation of markets for exports and im-
ports to particular members of the arrange-
ments;
(d) Co-operation with regard to the manufacture
of products, for example, through the
mutual exchange of technology, agreements
on the level of production and specializa-
tion of activities amongst members; and
(e) Collective action to enforce the arrange-
ments agreed upon.l 0
The unilateral control of private corporations over
the pricing process has always to some degree concerned na-
tional governments. Such concern has, however, mainly been
with regard to finding appropriate ways to exercise their
authority over the activities of such corporations to protect
primarily their national interests. The antitrust laws, or
regulations of restrictive business practices, are well-known
national prescriptions toward this end. The notion of anti-
trust law is of American origin. The American vision of a
self-regulating market system led to the development of anti-
trust law to prevent the interference with that system.1 11
One of the first, though unsuccessful, American antitrust
suits against the American corporations operating overseas
was brought in 1953. The Federal government brought a civil
suit against five multinational oil companies, owned largely
by United States citizens, because of the participation of
these companies in the Iranian consortium. 112 This case,
110. UNCTAD Doc. TD/185/Supp. 2 at 7.
Ill. See generally Fugate, "An Overview of Antitrust
Enforcement and the Multinational Corporation," 8 J. Int'l L.
& Eco. 1 (1973); Victor, "Multinational Corporations--Anti-
trust Extraterritoriality and the Prospect of Immunity," id.,
at 11; Smith, "Cartels and the Shield of Ignorance," id. at
53-84. For national laws of antitrust see Edwards, Control of
Cartels and Monopolies, supra note 56 (1967T.
112. United States v. Standard Oil Co., Socony-Vacuum
Oil Company, Inc., Standard Oil Company of California, the
Texas Company, Gulf Oil Corporation, No. 82-87, published in
Emergency Oil Lift Program pt. 3, cited in Leeman, supra note
26 at 153.
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known as the Cartel Case, was never brought to trial. The
legal ground for dismissal of the case was based on an opinion
of the Attorney General that the participation of the five
American oil companies in the Iranian consortium did not vio-
late the American antitrust law. An underlying political rea-
son, however, was to preclude any disruption of the world oil
supply. After the Korean boom and the Iranian nationalization
demand grew for oil resources by American allies in Western
Europe. The closing of the Suez Canal, which threatened the
supply of Western Europe, caused the United States to give
antitrust immunity to the oil companies in order not to in-
terrupt the supply of Western Europe.1l3
Cartel practices have long fared differently in Europe.
Contrary to attitudes in the United States and Canada,ll3a the
prohibition of restrictive business practices were rare in
Europe until after World War I. During the French Revolution,
France enacted penal provisions against monopoly business prac-
tices to fix prices at non-competitive levels.11 4  In 1884,
pressure groups to protect business sought a judicial Interpre-
tation of the above prescription and supplemented this with an
amendment in 1926.115 In Germany some publicists observed that
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of contract invalidates
any prescription which prohibits cartel contracts. 1 16 The op-
posing view comes from Biedenkopf, who insists that Indeed regu-
lating cartels is the constitutional guarantee of "contractual
freedom which demands an 'order of free determination of the
individual, protected against unlicensed interference from
private powers.' 1 17 The British Minister of Reconstruction
declared in 1944 that, although cartels' activities are not
necessarily against the public Interest, the power so to be is
113. K. Brewster, Antitrust and American Business
Abroad 4 (1958).
113a. For antitrust law in Canada, see L. Reynolds,
The Control of Competition in Canada (1940).
II. Edwards, supra note Ill, at 3-4.
115. Id.
116. See Huber, Die Verfassungsproblematik eines
Kartellverbots, Gutachten at 10 (1955); Gelger, Grundesetzlche
Schranken fur eine Kartellgesetzgebung at 6 (1955) cited in
Kronsteln, "A Symposium on Trade Regulation and Practices," 11
Vand. L. Rev. 271, 272 (1958).
177 H. Biedenkopf, Freiheitliche Ordnung durch
Kartel lverbot, Aktuel le Grundsatzfragen des Kartel I rechts
(1957) cited in Kronstein, supra note 116, at 272-273.
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nonetheless present.l1 7a Similarly, in other European coun-
tries there were shifts over time for and against cartel
practices, but in general there was no serious attempt agains
restrictive practices such as the one In the United States.1
In most developing countries because of a policy of
government ownership, cartel practices, particularly as re-
lated to international cartels, have not been subjected to
national regulation. This has created a number of problems.
A study by UNCTAD IV shows that the absence of controls on
cartel activity has, in certain cases, led subsidiaries In
developing countries to become parties to national and in.ter-
national cartel arrangements in developed countries. For ex-
ample, Bridon, the subsidiary of the United Kingdom in Mexico,
is a party to the export cartels in the United Kingdom in the
field of wire ropes and the associated international cartel
arrangements.ll8a In addition, it appears that transnational
corporations in developing countries have established import
cartels, which these corporations operate in developed coun-
tries. The study asserts: "As such, the cartels represent
not a defensive response to the existence of oligopoly and
monopoly power but a reenforcement of such power."1l 8b
Taxing is one way of indirect participation by govern-
ments in the pricing process. A primary objective of taxa-
tion on commodities is ordinarily to increase the income of
the states. The taxing power may, nevertheless, be deliberate-
ly used for other purposes and its exercise always affects the
price of goods and services. The taxation by primary producers
of their raw materials can be effectively aimed towards a re-
distribution of the economic values arising from exploitation
of their resources. By the end of the 1960's this kind of tax-
ation had achieved significant increase in the foreign exchange
of producing developing countries. In Chile, with respect to
copper production, the Braden Company was paying the Chilean
government 1% of the ross sales value, as taxes, over the
period of 1913-1924.1 9 This tax during 1930-1939 was less
117a. Para. 54 of the White Paper on Employment Policy,
The Times (London) May 27, 1944 cited In Edwards, supra note
111, at 9.
118. Edwards, supra note 111, at 3.
118a. See Royal Monopolies Commission, Wire and Fibre
Ropes: A Report on the Supply and Exports of Wire Rope and
Cordage (1973) cited in UNCTAD Doc. TD/185/Supp. 2 at 18.
118b. TD/185/Supp. 2 at 16.
119. Mamalakis, "Contribution of Copper to Chilean Eco-
nomic Development, 1920-1967: Profits of a Foreign-Owned Ex-
port Sector," in R. Mikesell (ed.), Foreign Investment in the
Petroleum and Mineral Industries 387 (1971).
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than 6% but reached 64% by 1953 through government action. 120
In the early oil concessions In the Middle East, tax exemption
of the concessionaire was almost a common practice. The only
exception was the concession between Iraq and IPC of 1925.121
Some of the earlier concessions with Sheikhs of the Persian
Gulf were silent on the question of taxation mainly because
the imposition of taxes was unknown to those areas. 122
Getty's concession in the Neutral Zone (1949) In Article 49
laid down the principle of freedom from taxation for the
company and its property. 123
From the beginning, the Imposition of taxes on oil re-
sources, was achieved either through the unilateral action of
the host governments or through negotiations with the con-
cessionaires. Taxation was introduced as a part of the con-
cept of equal sharing advocated by the oil producers. The
first legislation taxed the profits of oil companies and was
enacted in Saudi Arabia in accordance with a Royal Decree of
December 27, 1950.124 This Decree provided an Income tax on
companies engaged in production of hydrocarbons, the tax
amounting from 20% to 50% of their net operating income.
Kuwait and Bahrein followed a similar policy. 125 A Kuwait
Decree of December 1951 established an income tax equal to 50%
of the Income of corporations operating in the production and
marketing of oil. Bahrein's Decree, which was similar to
those of Qatar and Iraq, In 1952 imposed a 50% tax on oil
profits.12 6 Iran and Abu Dhabi implemented similar formulas
in their concessions through negotlations. 127 Venezuela
enacted 50/50 tax legislation from 1948-1958. By 1958
Venezuela had increased its taxes to some 70% of the profit
realized.128 As between the oil companies and the host gov-
ernments the tax formula has not always meant the same thing.
The formula has depended on particular concessions. The
terms of each 50/50 agreement determined what items were to
120. Id.
121. H. Cattan, The Evolution of Oil Concessions in
the Middle East and North Africa 43 (1967).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 44.
124. o-yal Decree No. 17/2/28/7634.
125. See Mikdashi, A Financial Analysis of Middle
Eastern Oil Concessions, 1901-1965 390 (1966).
126. See, Cattan, supra note 121, at 45; B. Shwadran,
The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers (1959) 260.
127. Shwadran at 398-399.
128. Hartshorn, supra note 74, at 177.
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be accepted as allowable costs before computing profits in
the host country, and whether certain items of expenditures
were expenses against current earnings or capitalized or
amortized over a longer period, 12 9  In 1953 the system of
50/50 taxing was made clearer. The Arabtan tax, for example,
was based on profits on sales at posted prices to parent com-
panies and it made the 50/50 profit system somewhat larger
than American taxes would have been on the same basis of in-
come and profit.130 Hartshorn concluded that 50/50 profit-
sharing presented largely a transfer of tax revenue from the
treasuries of the United States and England to those of the
Middle Eastern countries, and the companies became the chan-
nel for this transfer without substantial changes in their own
income.130a The French and Dutch tax laws at that time, how-
129. Following the Venezuelan example, Saudi Arabia in
1949 decreed an income tax of 50 percent on Aramco's income
after payment of the US tax. Subsequent to negotiations be-
tween Saudi Arabia on the one hand and the United States
Treasury, Aramco and its shareholders on the other, Saudi
Arabia drafted a law which imposed a 50 percent income tax
before payment of the American tax.
The Saudi Arabian government received considerable help
from the United States government. This legislation was a
general tax which was admissible for tax credit against the
company's American tax. This system increased Saudi Arabian
revenue substantially. The increase in Saudi Arabian revenue,
however, did not bring about a decrease in the income of
Aramco and Its parent companies, because the Saudi tax was
offset by reductions In American tax on the same Income. In
fact, "the Income on which the Saudi tax was charged origi-
nally differed from that on which the American tax was
[charged]. Aramco submitted to Arabian taxation in 1950-51
on profits calculated on transfer prices to its parent com-
pany lofftakers,' who received a substantial cost of sales'
discount below the price at which Arabian crude was available
to outsiders." This system reduced the "turnover and hence
the profit on which Arabian tax was charged. It may have
meant that the Arabian tax and royalty, which worked out a
higher total rate than American tax plus Arabian royalty had
done, but was applied to a lower profit, amounted in absolute
terms to about the same payments to governments, leaving the
companies roughly as before." Hartshorn, supra note 74, at
179. See also United Nations "Multinational Corporations in
World Development," ST/ECA/190 66-70 (1973).
130. Id. at 179.
130a. See Hartshorn, supra note 74, at 177-179.
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ever, excluded the profits made by their subjects abroad from
tax, therefore, the 50/50 arrangement cost those companies
more than the Americans. 131 In this taxing system, the post-
ed prices remained as the basis for tax formulation. During
the 1960's an oil surplus kept the posted prices up while the
actual prices were lower through discounts. The result was
that the real taxable revenues of the producers rose to 60%,
rather than 50%, of realized prices. 132
Sometimes multilateral agreements between developing
countries and multinational corporations provide for tax ex-
emption or reduction for specific projects. Such agreements
are designed to encourage investment according to governmental
plans. Similar policies are on occasion followed by developed
countries with respect to their private corporations, giving
them tax exemptions for investment In some developing coun-
tries.133
131. Id. at 180.
132. Id.
133. Sometimes instead of bilateral agreements between
governments on tax matters, developing countries have con-
cluded agreements with multinationals concerning specific
projects. They are mainly related to the granting of tax re-
lief as an investment-inducing measure, and usually also In-
clude non-tax matters and convertibility of earnings at a
fixed rate and other benefits. Some developed countries have
given encouragement to their corporations in the form of tax
matters for investing in developing countries. See, for ex-
ample, American measures on such encouragement, Senate Com-
mittee on Finance, Implications of Multinational Firms for
World Trade and Investment for US Trade and Labor 71, 124-125,
882-884 (1973).
Agreements between developing states and multinationals,
however, are not allowed to contravene the tax laws of world-
wide taxing home countries. For the practice of Common Market
members on tax, see 'Tax harmonization measures planned for
first stage of the proposed economic and monetary union" in 2
European Taxation, 1971. Another factor encouraging a more
uniform taxation of multinational corporations arises out of
dissatisfaction over the variety of methods used to integrate
the corporate and Individual income tax. See C. Shoup, Public
Finance (1969). Many countries are afraid that the methods of
integration of other countries may become more attractive to
direct investment. See "A Comparative Analysis of the Classi-
cal, Dual Rate, and Imputation Taxation Systems and an Exami-
nation of the Corporate Tax System In Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom," in 12 European
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The most direct exclusive control of states over pric-
ing has commonly been achieved through the establishment and
control of national companies. Such a practice, increasing in
developing countries in the modern market structure, is not a
new concept. During the Hitler and Mussolini days in Germany
and Italy, government cartels were employed in an effective
strategy of control over both internal and external affairs. 134
Today all forms of national companies are regarded as means
for maintaining direct exclusive controls by governments. The
more immediate impact of such controls, however, may be more
national than transnational. If, on the other hand, the share
of a particular state in the transnational production and dis-
tribution of a commodity is high, the unilateral action of the
state may have immediate worldwide impact. For example, in the
case of grain, the United States alone as the major producer has
effective control over production of this vital resource and it
is likely that in the future world dependency on the U.S. grain
export will increase. This dominance in production will give
the United States a measure of power "it had never had before--
possibly an economic and political dominance greater than that
of the immediate post-World War II years."l 35
The impact of exclusive governmental and private control
upon external value processes and the common interests of
larger communities have led, beyond the slow growth of nation-
al prescriptions in regulations, to the development of some
modest inclusive prescriptions about exclusive national compe-
tence. The European Economic Community (EEC), a partially in-
clusive organization with the objective of protection of shared
Taxation, May-June 1972 Nos. 5 & 6, at 1/112-174. See also
(United Kingdom) 'Tax Reform," 12 European Taxation Mar. 1972,
No. 3.
134. Kapper, "The International Regulation of Cartels--
Current Proposals," 40 Va. L. Rev. 1005, 1007 (1954).
135. Weinstein, "CIA Study Says Food Crisis Could In-
crease US Power," Int'l Herald Tribune Mar. 18 (1975) at 3,
col. 1. For EEC law on monopoly, see Schumacher, "A Common
Market Overview of the Competition Poblem in the Seventies,"
in L. Theberge (ed.), Current Legal Aspects of Doing Business
in Europe 58 (1971); Deringer, "A Practitioner Looks at the
German and EEC Rules As Applied to Acquisitions, Mergers, and
Joint Ventures," in id. at 64. Newes, "The EEC Treaty As Ap-
plied to DistributionArrangements and Industrial Property
Rights," in id. at 72-78 and Rahl, "Relationship of US to EEC
Antitrust Law-," in id. at 79-94.
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interest of its members, has considered the possibility of
negative impact of the practices of Its members In pricing
on the overall inclusive interest of the community. Article
37(1) of the EEC Agreement, referring to such concern,
reads-,
1. Member States shall progressively adjust any
State monopolies of a commercial character
so as to ensure that when the transnational
period has ended, no discrimination regard-
ing the conditions under which goods are pro-
duced and marketed exists between nationals
and Member States.13 6
This concern for control of monopoly practice brought some
changes in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) In
1951. The purpose of ECSC was to establish international
control over the coal and steel industries of member coun-
tries In order to create an international market, through
political unification of the member-states.137 The agree-
ment of the community was to prohibit restrictive practices
which were incompatible with the purpose of the community, by
both public and private sectors. It should be noted that the
EEC prescriptions include public as well as private partici-
pants. Article 85(0) of the EEC Treaty expands the prohibi-
tion of monopoly and condemns practices which directly or in-
directly fix purchase or selling prices 138 limit or control
production and technical development, 133 store market or
sources of supply,1 40 apply conditions which put the other
party at a competitive disadvantage and conditioning the
agreement to other situations which have no relation to the
agreement in hand.14 1 Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, expanding
136. Quoted in Wortley, "Monopolies," In B. Wortley
(ed.),The Law of the Common Market 77 (1974).
137. Edwards, supra note 111, at 7.
138. See Cement Case 1873 CMLR 7, cited in Wortley,
at 86, 87.
139. See Italy v. EEC Council and Commission, 1969
CMLR 39, cited in Ibid.
140. See Gruding Case, 1969 CMLR 418, cited in Id.
141. Id. There are, however, some exceptions to
Article 85()- Article 85(3) states the exceptions as:
The provisions of paragraph I may, however, be de-
clared inapplicable In the case of:
-- any agreement or category of agreements be-
tween undertakings;
-- any decision or category of decisions by
associations of undertakings;
-- any concerted practice or category of con-
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the concept of the prohibition of abuse of monopoly power,
reads:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a
dominant position within the Common Market
or In a substantial part of it shall be pro-
hibited as incompatible with the Common Market
insofar as it may affect trade between Member
States. Such abuse may, in particular, con-
sist in:
(a) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair
purchase or selling prices or other un-
fair trading conditions.
(b) Limiting production, markets or tech-
nical development to the prejudice of
consumers.
(c) Applying dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them
at a competitive disadvantage.
(d) Making the conclusion of contracts sub-
ject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by
their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the sub-
ject of such contracts. J42
certed practices; which contributes to
improving the production or distribu-
tion of goods or to promoting technical
or economic progress, while allowing con-
sumers a fair share of the resulting bene-
fit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned re-
strictions which are not indispensable to the at-
tainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility
of eliminating competition in respect of a substan-
tial part of the products in question.
Quoted in id. at 88.
2-B. Wortley (ed.), An Introduction to the Law and
of the European Economic Community 72-76 (1972). For more on
this article see C. Bellamy, The Common Market Law of Competi-
tion 701-743 (1973. For the application of this Article to
the Continental Can Case of 1972 see 5 EEC Bulletin 64 (1972).
For the ruling of the European Communities Court of Justice on
the same case in Feb. 1973 which ruled against the Commission
decision, see Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. v.
EEC Commission, [1973] CMLR 199, cited in Wortley, supra note
136, at 84.
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The emphasis and pressure put by EEC has made the members
change their internal prescriptions to meet EEC requirements
regardless of their sympathy with some monopoly practices.
2. Partially Inclusive Competence Over Pricing
A relatively recent feature of the international pric-
ing process is the emergence of partially inclusive inter-
governmental organizations which assert, within the larger per-
missible framework of international law, a strong effective
power and a number of particular competences about pricing.
These particular competences include the intelligence, promo-
tion, prescription and, to a lesser degree, the application
functions. The thrust of these organizations Is in direct op-
position to the capitalist laissez-faire notion of a self-
regulating market and aims toward a conscious change In
market forces. The principal participants in these partially
Inclusive organizations are the exporting developing coun-
tries. These new organizations have been aptly described as
the "trade unions" of "the poor nations." Their objective is
to negotiate a new deal with the rich countries through the in-
strument of collective bargaining: that Is, "to obtain great-
er equality of opportunity and to secure the right to sit as
equals around the bargaining tables of the world."1 43
These new associations do not fit the requirements of an
Inter-governmental specialized agency under the Article 57 of
the United Nations Charter. Article 57(1) of the Charter de-
fines specialized agencies as Inter-governmental organizations
with the objectives of "having wide international responsi-
bilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic
social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields."1 43a
The objectives of the producers' associations are obviously
more limited. They may perhaps be best described as associ-
ations of interest groups, which in some measure align bloc
against bloc. They have such wide membership that they cannot
be considered as exclusive organizations; yet they are not wide
enough in membership and purpose to be referred to as inclu-
sive, for direct and explicit relation to the most inclusive
world organization, the United Nations. For these reasons we
recognize these associations as a new phenomenon in interna-
tional trade and refer to them as partially inclusive inter-
143. Mahbub ul Haq, "Negotiating a New Bargain with the
Rich Countries," in G. Erb & V. Kalleb (eds.), Beyond Dependen-
cy: The Developing World Speaks Out 157, 158 6975).
143a. UN Charter, Art. 51(1).
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governmental organizations.
The idea for creating these partially inclusive or-
ganizations derives from the desire of the developing coun-
tries for greater development and their recognition of the
non-conformity of the market structure with that desire. The
disappointment they faced in their treatment by industrial
countries has been almost universal:
For the producers of minerals, there is more-
over (as for oil) the keen sense that their
minerals are non-renewable, an asset that
should produce the greatest possible return
and if possible have its useful life stretched
out. Hence, it is only natural that producers
should seek to change a situation in which, by
and large, the sellers of non-fuel minerals
are competing, diffuse, and unorganized in the
face of relatively few and well-organized buy-
ers on behalf of the consuming countries. 14 4
The combined effect of these factors--concern for development,
a realistic perception of limited resources and ability, and
most importantly, the lack of sympathy for their goals in the
market structures and in the developed countries--have fueled
their effort to establish a new form of collective bargain-
ing. It has been their hope that "[a] group position is more
likely to win than an individual position because of the
greater power and resources behind It, because of its greater
moral legitimacy (one's cause seems more 'right' when others
support it), and because it is more likely to be a moderate
and general position (hence more amenable to accomodation).,145
The Trilateral Commission aptly summarizes the objectives of
these organizations:
to stabilize market prices;
to prevent market prices from falling below produc-
tion costs;
to offset the market power of private firms;
to respond to other market imperfections, such as
barriers to exports in processed forms;
to exchange Information and to coordinate tech-
nical and other developments.1 4 6
144. Varon & Takeuchi, "Developing Countries and Non-
Fuel Minerals," 52 Foreign Affairs 505 (1974).
145. Randolph, "A Suggested Model of International
Negotiation," 10 J. Conflict Res. 345 (1966).
146. Trilateral Commission, Seeking a New Accommoda-
tion in World Commodity Market 13-14 (1976). The Commission
concludes that creating the shortage in the market through
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The authority of the producers to establish these new
associations derives from their combined sovereignty over
their resources. This interpretation has been confirmed In
the resolution of the New Economic Order. Article 5 of the
NEO states that: "All States have the right to associate in
organizations of primary commodity producers In order to de-
velop their national economies to achieve stable financing
for their development, and in pursuance of their alms, to
assist in the promotion of sustained growth of the world econ-
omy, in particular accelerating the development of developing
countries. Correspondingly all States have the duty to re-
spect that right by refraining from applying economic and
political measures that would limit it." Similarly, the
UNCTAD meeting of 1964 (Geneva) adopted a recommendation which
confirms the status of producers' organizations:
Recognizing the particular urgent character of the
trade needs of developing countries whose exports
are mainly composed of non-renewable natural products,
Considering the need for those countries to reach
speedily a certain stage of economic development
for which investment capital can be raised, by in-
creasing the per unit income from their exports,
Recommends that international organizations set up
by the developing countries which are the principal
exporters of non-renewable natural products be
recognized and encouraged to enable them to defend
their interest.147
This recommendation was adopted by a roll-call vote of 83 to 1,
with 25 abstentions. The opposing vote was from the United
States.
systematic decrease of production does not necessarily come
from a formal association. It could result from the actions
of a dominant firm or government (in the case of phosphates)
or an informal grouping (in the case of manganese). Besides,
to increase the price does not necessarily come from produc-
tion control, but from increases in taxation such as Jamaican
increase in the bauxite tax or other internal measures such
as the control of export by encouraging domestic processing in
the case of iron ore in Australia and export control in the
case of Canada. Id. at 14.
147. Proceedings of the UN Conference on Trade and De-
velopment, Geneva 1964 Mar. 23 to June 16, Final Act and Re-
port, E/Conf.46/141, Vol. I at 63 Annex A. VI.2.
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Producers' associations are not cartels in the same
sense as are the great private associations. They are inter-
governmental organizations which have the objective of pro-
tecting the total well-being of their nation-state members as
opposed to cartels formed by private corporations which have
the primary objective merely of profit maximization. The
scope of operation of a private export cartel is not limited
to price fixing, but also includes the allocation and control
of production and market sharing. Furthermore, the private ex-
port cartel monitors the activities of its members and penal-
izes them in cases of violationl48 With respect to OPEC,
for example, these functions are not performed and Its members
do not accept comparable obligations:
Their agreement on oil export prices is
strictly voluntary, and does not carry
with it sanctions or rewards. Moreover,
the agreements leave to the discretion of
each member government the setting and
changing of prices within a range con-
sidered reasonable by OPEC members. A
close scrutiny of OPEC's resolutions shows
that the organization does not have supra-
national powers, and its resolutions are
merely guideposts for action. Member coun-
tries do not delegate to any central body
their decision-making powers. Indeed,
they jealously guard their sovereignty,
and consider their freedom of action to be
paramount. 149
One fundamental difference between OPEC and the private
cartels is thus that the members of OPEC in promoting its poli-
cies do not give up their freedom of action. This fact was
recognized at the beginning of the establishment of this or-
ganization. As emphasized by the Venezuelan representative,
"[ilt must be borne in mind that the governments are sovereign
and can in no way be compelled to fulfil to the letter their
obligations toward OPEC which, in any case, are more in the
nature of moral obligations." 150 In practice, further, the
OPEC resolutionson pricing have not always been followed at
148. See "Should Export Cartels be More Closely Con-
trolled?" OECD Observer Nov. 1974, at 30-32.
149. Mikdashi, supra note 74, at 77-78.
150. "Perez Alfonso Clarifies Venezuelan Attitude To-
ward OPEC," Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) supp. Oct. 11,
1963, quoted in id., at 78.
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the stipulated times. 15 1 It will be observed that comparable
freedoms are embodied in the charters of other producers'
associations.
Because of their importance to the world economy, there
are increasing demands that these organizations be required to
meet International standards of responsibility, of at least
minimum order, In the exercise of effective control over pro-
duction and pricing. 152 Some of these responsibilities have
already been recognized and accepted, for example, by OPEC.
In the Solemn Declaration of the Algiers Conference, the
OPEC members clearly announced the policies of ensuring a
continuous and sufficient uninterrupted supply to consumers. 15 3
The Declaration also states that coordination among producers
should be managed in confirmity with creating a balance b%-
tween oil production and the needs of the world market.15
Thus, maintenance of the supply of oil has officially been
acknowledged by Arab oil producers as their international re-
sponsibility.155
From the beginning, OPEC has tried to establish rela-
tions with various international organizations in order to con-
firm its competences and responsibilities and enhance its ac-
ceptability and recognition. Its documents of establishment
were registered in November of 1962 with the Secretariat of the
United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter.
OPEC has also established working relations with the Economic
and Social Council. The General Assembly has authorized the
Economic and Social Council to establish relations with Inter-
governmental organizations which do not fall within the defi-
nition of the Article 57 of the Charter. 156 Based on this pro-
vision, OPEC has participated in Regional Economic Commissions
151. Id.
152. Gardner, "The Hard Road to World Order," 52
Foreign Affairs 566 (1974); see also statement at The Sixth
Special Session of the United Nations, General Assembly by
Philippines, A/PV 2218, at 23-26.
153. Reprinted in 18 MEES No. 22 (1975).
154. Id. at para. 10.
155. See policy statement delivered by King Khalld of
Saudi Arabia -Apr. 1, 1975, reported in 18 MEES No. 24, 1975;
Al-Hamad, International Finance--An Arab Point of View 5-6
(1974), cited in Shihata, '"Arab Oil Policies and the New In-
ternational Economic Order," 16 Va. J. Intll L. 261, 265 n.18
(1976).
156. Report of the Preparatory Commission to the Gen-
eral Assembly, Vol. 11 at 123, cited in F. Rouhani, A History
of OPEC, 140 (1971)
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for Latin America, Asia, and the Far East. OPEC also parti-
cipated in the second symposium on the development of petro-
leum resources organized by the Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East in Tehran, in September 1962. In 1964, OPEC
sent an application to the United Nations for acquiring con-
sultative status with the Economic and Social Council. The
Council adopted a resolution recognizing such status for OPEC
on July 1, 1965.157 The secretary General of the United
Nations was requested to take measures for "(a) ensuring the
reciprocal exchange of information and documents, (b) having
OPEC represented at meetings of the Organs of the United Na-
tions at which questions of mutual Interest are scheduled to
be discussed, and (c) ensuring consultation and technical co-
operation between OPEC and the United Nations in regard to
matters of mutual interest."15 8 Finally, OPEC members have
tried to express their concern for world inflation and rising
oil prices in recent years through different aid programs to
developing countries. 159 Though these aid programs have not
been entirely successful, they are nonetheless an expression
of a sense of responsibility in times of international crisis.
The emergence of the producers' associations has been
in general the result both of the unfavorable conditions in
international trade for the fulfillment of demanded develop-
ment projects and of the lack of an appropriate more inclu-
sive decision process to promote the accelerating demands for
world reform to achieve a more equitable distribution of
values. The important task for the larger community now is
to relate these partially inclusive organizations as new fac-
tors in the pricing process, with all their competences and
responsibilities, to broader conceptions of the common in-
terest. An analysis of some of the more detailed conditions
under which the producers' associations have emerged may ex-
plain the more important contemporary expectations about the
role and function of these associations and aid In relating
their activities to the common Interest. Our analysis begins
with the emergence of OPEC, as the first and the most effec-
tive partially inclusive organization. Then we move to other
examples of such organizations.
The monopolistic activities of major multinational oil
companies both in the process of oil exploitation and In the
political processes of the Middle East are well known and
thoroughly documented by economists and political scientists.
157. Id. at 140.
158. ITd,
159. Fo-r OPEC aids, see Williams, "The Aid Programs of
the OPEC Countries," 54 Foreign Affairs 308-324 (1976).
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The objectives of the major oil companies have included the
maximization not only of wealth, but also of power.1 60 The
importance of power in the formulation of pricing cannot of
course be Ignored. With almost absolute monopoly control,
the oil companies set the price of oil at $2.17 per barrel In
1948.161 This price was gradually reduced by the unilateral
decisions of the oil companies to $1.80 by 1960, regardless
of the impact on the producers' well-being.162 The low price
of Middle East oil during 1949-1959, in relation to the oil
of the Western Hemisphere and the prices of products in the
European market, deprived the Middle Eastern producing coun-
tries of a rightful share of the profits, estimated by a
former Saudi Arabia oil Minister at $4.74 billlon.1 63 During
the same period the prices of oil from the Gulf of Mexico and
Venezuela were nearly 70% and 40% respectively higher than the
Persian Gulf price of oil of comparable quality.1 4 This con-
sistent unilateral decrease in the price of oil (which led to
a decline of the revenues of the producing states, while main-
taining high profits for the oil companies) gave rise to the
demand by the oil producers for profit sharing. The purpose
of the producing states In their demand for profit sharing was
in the beginning merely to increase their earnings; they were
not concerned about, and did not seek to participate In, price
determination. 165 Once they came to participate In profit
sharing, the producing states naturally became concerned about
price formulation as affecting their share. 16 6 To deal with
this concern, oil companies began to publicize or, in petro-
leum terminology, to "post" prices of Middle East oil. The
160. See, Hirst, supra note 102 at 37-43; Engler, supra
note 78 at 197-220; Tanzer, s note 101; Kronstein, supra
note 56 at 92; Rifaispra note-88 at 2, and a paper de-
livered to the Third Arab Petroleum Congress (from Oct. 16-21,
1961) by Dr. Muhammad Lebib Shuquair, 'The Relative Bargaining
Power of the Arab States and the Oil Companies and Its Effect
in Determining the Financial Provisions of the Oil Concession
Agreements."
161. Jowlson & Griffin, "The Legal Status of Nation-
State Cartels Under United States Antitrust and Public Inter-
national Law," 9 Int'l Law. 617, 618 (1975).
162. Id.
163. Rouhani, supra note 156, at 191.
164. Id. at 190.
165. Ca-ttan, supra note 121, at 51.
166. Hartshorn, supra note 74, at 149; Hirst, supra note
102, at 42.
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posting, however, carried no indication that oil companies
would respect the claim of the producers for participation in
the pricing process at any level.167 The function of posting
was only to establish those prices as a basis for the calcu-
lation of the royalties and income taxes to be payable to the
producers. 168
Concern for participation In pricing began with the
growing consciousness among the Middle Eastern countries about
the value of their resources. The price issue was first
brought up formally at the Second Arab Petroleum Congress held
in 1959 with an elaborate paper presented by the Saudi oil
Minister Sheik Abdullah Tariki, concerning the formulation of
the price of crude oil. 169 This paper was the beginning of
formal and collective concern. It was, however, the decline
in oil prices which made the producing countries take a fur-
ther step and establish OPEC in 1960.170 The primary objec-
tive of OPEC at the time of its establishment was the preven-
tion of decrease in oil prices. The initial efforts of OPEC
were successful in stabilizing the price of oil at the August
1960 level. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with the distribu-
tion of profits arising from their oil resources led the OPEC
members to expand the organization's scope of action to im-
prove their income. The basic strategy chosen by OPEC to this
end has been through formulating common policies concerning
the stabilization of prices. The first effort in this respect
was Resolution 32, adopted at the Fourth Conference in June
1962.171 This Resolution protested against the price reduc-
tion effected by the oil companies in August 1960 and the fact
that the oil companies had so far taken no steps to restore
prices to the pre-August 1960 level. The Resolution empha-
sized the importance of oil revenues to the producers. It
stated that a fall In the price of crude oil impairs the pur-
chasing power of member countries with respect to manufactured
products, which products are essential to their development.
167. Hartshorn at 149.
168. M. El-Mulhim, Redistribution of Values Arising
from the Oil Industry In the Middle East 221 (unpublished
J.S.D. thesis in Yale Law School Library 1970).
169. Rouhani, supra note 156, at 178.
170. The original participants of OPEC were Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. For a brief summary of its
establishment, see Hirst, supra note 102, at 100-119; Rouhani,
supra note 156; Fesharaki, Development of the Iranian Oil In-
dustry: International and Domestic Aspects 4-62 (1976).
171. For text of Resolution, see Rouhani at 195-196.
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Contrasting the rise in prices of manufactures with the fall
in the price of oil, the Resolution justified the participa-
tion of the producers in the pricing process on the grounds
that
the oil industry having the character of a
public utility, member countries cannot be
indifferent to such a vital element of the
industry as the determination of the price
of oil. [Therefore, the Resolution recom-
mended] That member countries should forth-
with enter into negotiations with the oil
companies concerned and (or) any other author-
ity or body deemed appropriate, with a view
to ensuring that oil produced in member coun-
tries shall be paid for on the basis of posted
prices not lower than those which applied prior
to August, 1960.
That the member countries shall jointly formu-
late a rational price structure to guide their
long-term price policy, on which subject the
Board of Governors Is hereby directed to pre-
pare a comprehensive study at the earliest
possible date. An important element of the
price structure to be devised will be the link-
ing of crude oil prices to an Index of prices
of goods that the member countries need to im-
port. 17 2
This Resolution was followed by an Explanatory Memoran-
dum issued by the OPEC Secretariat further stressing the im-
portance of oil revenue to the producing countries and noting
a lack of benefits to consumers, in that:
7. The fall in crude oil prices has brought no
benefit to the consumer because, as decreases
in ex-tax price of products have been intro-
duced into the market, fresh taxes have been Im-
posed by the consuming country governments. Fur-
thermore, the cost of manufactured goods, in-
stead of diminishing in proportion to the reduc-
tion of the price of crude oil, has on the con-
trary increased. 173
The Memorandum made a comparison between distribution of eco-
nomic values arising from oil resources through different tax-
ing systems and claimed that the governments of the European
172. Id.
173. Fo-r text, see id. at 196-200.
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consumers made two or three times more from taxation on oil
products than did the producers.173a OPEC in a number of
173a. For example, "when a motorist buys one liter of
premium gasoline for 1.04 francs, he gives no more than 6
centimes to the country which supplies the crude oil, while
he pays 79 centimes to the taxing authority of his own coun-
try. The remainder, about 19 centimes, covers transportation,
refining, marketing, and sellers' profit. . . . Thus, In both
cases [the other case is that of the United Kingdom], the
payment which the producing country receives is less than 6
percent of the average price to be consumed. These examples
could easily be multiplied. It would be enough for the final
consumer to look at the above figures to realize what a very
grave error it would be for him to think that an unduly large
part of the price he pays for the oil he consumes goes to the
owner of the raw material." In the Memorandum the OPEC re-
ferred to the different measures taken by individual states
to control the economy for their national development and oil
producers could be given similar rights:
10. During the last few decades, many countries have
resorted to different measures of regulation of the
internal economy (nationalization, production quotas,
etc.) to ensure a steady rate of economic growth free
from violent fluctuations. In the oil industry, there
have been prominent examples of such measures (especially
in the United States) affecting the free play of the
supply and demand and therefore the price. But such
safeguards have been relatively absent from the inter-
national scene. Competition in the sale of petroleum
on the international markets has increased since 1957,
due partly to the availability of a large amount of
surplus producing capacity. But the oil-exporting
countries are dependent on the international trade of
petroleum, and their economies are especially vulner-
able to fluctuations in price. It is therefore natural
that these countries should take steps to safeguard
their interest. This does not mean that they are op-
posed to competition as such. It only means that they
cannot sit by with arms folded watching unrestrained
competition destroying their chances for the future
through successive decreases in the price of crude
oil and in the face of mounting prices for their re-
quirements of imported manufactured goods.
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
other resolutions has been concerned about the price issue and
has encouraged the more detailed studies of the price struc-
ture of the oi l industry. 174
Another policy adopted by OPEC was in a prorationing
scheme. Prorationing refers to control of production. The
idea first began in the United States, allegedly for purposes
of conservation. There have, however, always been serious
doubts about the validity of the conservation argument; the
concept has sometimes appeared to be a covert strategy for
price control. The prorationing concept was introduced to
OPEC by Dr. Perez Alfonso of Venezuela. Dr. Alfonso's basic
objective was to protect, or at least equalize, the interest
of Venezuela in relation to Persian Gulf producers. The cost
of producing a barrel of oil in Venezuela was 51 cents In
1968, but in the Middle East, about 15 cents.1 75 In addition
to this contrast in production costs, Venezuela's revenue was
substantially lower than that of the Middle East. The effect
of the OPEC establishment in its first year on Venezuela's
revenue was only a 3 percent increase over 1959, as con-
trasted with 14 percent for the Middle East producers. This
obviously put Venezuela in a disadvantageous position. The
idea of prorationing as a means of price control, In conjunc-
tion with conservation, was generally accepted by OPEC members,
but the criteria by which quotas should be allocated among the
member-states remained a difficult issue. Among the criteria
presented were the volume of resources, the rate of current
production, the size of investment and population, and degree
of economic growth desired. Because of disagreements among
members about these criteria, in the Eighth OPEC Conference in
Geneva in 1965, a Permanent Economic Commission was establ ished
and assigned the task of studying the issue. In the Ninth Con-
ference in Tripoli, the Commission formulated a quota system
based on world demand (Resolution IX.61). This quota system
was changeable on a yearly basis.
The quota system was designed only as a guideline and
was not compulsory. The system was opposed by a number of
174. Resolutions Nos. 33, and 34, IV Conference of 1962;
No. 4 of V Conference; 49 and 50 of VII Conference; 55 and 56
of VIII Conference; 61 of IX Conference; 64 of X Conference;
72 of XI Conference; 76 of XII Conference; 80 and 81 of XIII
Conference; 84 of XIV Conference; and 94 and 95 of XVII Con-
ference; 103 of XVIII Conference; 105 of XIX Conference.
175. C. Tugendhat, Oil: The Biggest Business 189 (1968).
On prorationing see also Rouhani, supra note 156, at 211-215.
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OPEC members, including Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia. 17 6 The
prorationing system, in practice, was never accepted by OPEC.
Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia always operated above their quota.
Finally, the resolutions of the Eleventh OPEC Conference held
in Vienna in April 1966 omitted any direct mention of the pro-
rationing scheme.
Another strategy for participation in pricing adopted
by OPEC after 1971 included both multilateral negotiations
with the oil companies and unilateral government actions. The
belief that the price of crude oil, despite all OPEC efforts,
was kept at an artificially low level over the entire post-
war period up to 1971 and that the expansion of economic growth
in the Western Hemisphere was due to cheap oil, stimulated the
producers to take more effective action toward control of the
price of their oil. The producers justified their demand for
more effective participation in pricing on the basis that the
trade situation was increasingly moving against their own eco-
nomic well-being. The tax policy of the importing countries,
when compared with the income taxes of the producers, was also
regarded as unfair and inconsistent with the treatment recom-
mended by UNCTAD. For example, the share of the producers of
oil sold in Western Europe in 1967 was 7.9 percent, while the
taxes of the consumer governments averaged 47.5 percent.1 7 7
The producers argued for a more equitable taxing system; in
fact, the target of the OPEC demand was the consumer govern-
ments rather than the oil companies. They claimed that if the
price of oil was too high for the consumers, their governments
should reduce their excessive taxes.l78 Another concern re-
lated to the decline of the purchasing power of the U.S. dol-
lar. The dollar fell by 27 percent during 1960-1970, while
the increase in the cost of living rose 24.9 percent in the
176. For the Iranian position, see Petroleum Intelli-
gence Weekly May 17, 1966. For the Saudi Arabian position
see MEES supp. Feb. 11, 1966.




Distribution and Marketing 26.0
Oil Company net profits 6.3
Oil Producer's share 7.9
Consumer government's taxes 47.5
See R. Sanghavi, Iran: Destiny of Oil 11 (1971) cited in
Fesharaki, supra note 170, at 113.
178. Fesharaki, at 113-114.
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United States and 39.7 percent in the United Kingdom. 179 The
issue was the higher prjce of manufactured goods as compared
with primary products.1 0 Therefore, OPEC recommended its
members to take appropriate action to protect their interest.
In Resolution XXII.131, OPEC asked that: "Each member coun-
try exporting oil from Gulf terminals shall introduce . . .
legal and/or legislative measures for the implementation of
the objectives embodied in Res. XXI.120." The appropriate
measures included total embargo on shipments of crude oil and
petroleum products of companies violating the resolution.
The above factors were the basis for success of the
Tehran Agreement, by which the companies accepted OPEC Reso-
lutions 120 and 122. They agreed to increase the posted prices
to compensate for inflation on June 1, 1971 and January 1, 1973
through 1975. In return the companies were guaranteed security
of supply for the remainder of the five years, during which
there was to be no demand for revision of the terms of posted
prices until 1975. In general, however, the Tehran Agreement
had little effect on price changes. The posted prices were
increased by 35 cents per barrel, which meant that the govern-
ments received 19 cents per barrel more than they did before.18 1
Although the Tehran Agreement was designed to keep the
Persian Gulf producers quiet for 5 years, Libya and Algeria in-
sisted that the Tehran settlement was not even close to their
minimum demand. Through negotiations with the oil companies
they concluded an agreement on April 2, 1971 (the Tripoli Agree-
ment) in which the interests of the producers were much better
protected than they were in the Tehran Agreement. Under the
Tripoli Agreement, Libya increased its posted prices to about
90 cents per barrel, which was a seven-cent increase as compared
with a five-cent increase in the Persian Gulf. Besides a 55
percent income tax provision there was an additional surcharge
of nine cents per barrel and compulsory reinvestment of the com-
panies' net profit in Libya for further exploration for up to
five years in the future. 82
The Tehran and Tripoli Agreements are examples of changes
in pricing by multilateral agreements. Nevertheless, they were
among the first manifestations of cooperation with regard to
179. Shah of Iran, Press Conference, Tehran, Jan. 24,
1971, cited in id. at 114.
180. I d.-
181. Id. at 116 and Rouhani, supa note 156, at 18.
182. Fo-r the text of the Tripo i and Tehran Agreements
see MEES and Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, Dec. 1971 issue.
For Tripoli agreement see also Rouhani, at 22-23.
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pricing; a clear shift in power from the companies to the
producers was becoming obvious. The OPEC Geneva Agreement
of 1972 recommending an 8.49 percent increase in posted
prices because of dollar devaluation, was the beginning of
unilateral action of OPEC members. In October 1973 six
Persian Gulf producers unilaterally added 70 percent to the
price of oil, and recommended the same policy to other OPEC
members.1 83 This unilateral decision was later explained
by one observer as follows: "after weeks of unsuccessful
negotiations with the companies, the oil-exporting govern-
ments declared their intention to establish oil prices among
themselves, free from the obstruction tactics of the com-
panies in bilateral bargaining." 184 The OPEC decided to
raise the posted prices from $3.00 to $5.12 without nego-
tiating with the oil companies. The Arab-Israeli war was a
favorable factor for making such unilateral actions ac-
ceptable.185 Since that time a unilateral competence has
been consistently asserted.
The basic exercise of the competence of OPEC in the
pricing process, as has been indicated, is through the in-
telligence, promotion, and (to some modest degree) prescribing
functions. The application of recommendations has been large-
ly left to members, through their individual or joint action.
The recommendations of OPEC are not compulsory but advisory,
and there is no sanctioning process in case a member refuses
to accept a particular recommendation. The necessity of co-
ordination in pricing policy among members for protection of
their common interests has, however, been recognized by the
members themselves.1 8 6 Similar policies and practices have
183. See Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, Oct. 22, 1973,
at 9.
184. Amuzegar, "OPEC in the Context of the Global Power
Equation," 4 Denver J. Int'l L. & Pol. 221, 222 (1974).
185. Industrialized countries were faced with embargo
by Arab oil producers against "unfriendly" countries. The
threat and concern of the embargo, which cut production 30
percent created a shortage overshadowing the unilateral price
increase. The embargo and the shortage of oil had panicked
Western consumers so much that in an auction in Iran in
December of 1973, $17.34 per barrel was offered for small
quantities of Iranian oil and $20 for Nigerian oil. The em-
bargo, however, was offered for small quantities of Iranian
oil and $20 for Nigerian oil. The embargo, however, was fol-
lowed by another unilateral price increase in December 1973
to $11.65 per barrel. Fesharaki, supra note 170, at 118.
186. See Marbo, "Can OPEC Hold The Line?" 18 MEES I,
2 No. 19, 1975.
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been effectively followed by other producer associations.
The Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting
Countries (CIPEC) was established in 1967 by the major cop-
per producers, Chile, Peru, Zaire and Zambia, who controlled
35 percent of the world mine production. Article 2 of the
CIPEC Charter states that the objectives of the organization
are:
(a) to coordinate measures designed to foster,
through the expansion of the industry, dynamic
and continuous growth of real earnings from copper
exports, and to ensure a real forecast of such
earnings;
(b) to promote the harmonization of the decisions
and policies of the member countries on problems
relating to the production and marketing of copper;
(c) to obtain better and more complete information
and appropriate advice on the production and market-
ing of copper for member countries;
(d) in general, to increase resources for the eco-
nomic and social development of producer countries
bearing in mind the interest of consumers.1 87
CIPEC has not been highly successful in the areas of price
maintenance or increase. The strategy of cutbacks in pro-
duction of November 1974 by 10 percent proved to be inade-
quate in 1975, basically because of the small percentage of
cutback and the low demand for copper.18 CIPEC has, none-
theless, been successful as an intelligence center for securing,
processing, and distributing information designed to improve
and encourage the awareness of the common problems of its mem-
bers. Regardless of the sociopolitical differences among its
members, CIPEC has kept its solidarity. For example, in 1973,
in supporting Chile with its nationalization of Kennecott in
1971, CIPEC members decided not to replace copper on the world
market where Chilean copper was seized through legal actions
brought by Kennecott.1 89 CIPEC has also agreed to establish
"la permanent mechanism of protection and solidarity in the
event of economic or commercial aggression against any of the
Organization's member countries." 190
187. Quoted in Mikdashi, supra note 24, at 83.
188. Id. at M.
189. Id. at 88.
190. ICopper Nations Form Pact to Support Chile,"
Times (London), Jan. 16, 1973, at 15 quoted in Id.
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Before CIPEC, copper prices were controlled by non-U.S.
multinational copper firms1 9 1 and voluntary production restric-
tion and sale-purchase operations on the London Metal Exchange
(LME).19 2 These operations were generally supported by the
producers. By late 1963 the demand began to decline and the
market situation changed to a "buyers' market." The attempts
of copper firms and producers to stabilize the price by cutting
the production and other methods were not effective, and this
situation endured until 1966. The non-sensitivity of the con-
sumers to the problem facing the developing copper producers
aggravated the situation. In 1966 the individual producers be-
gan to raise their own prices unilaterally, but after a few
months, because of lack of success, they decided to follow the
price policy of LME. 193 The establishment of CIPEC was the
last resort of developing producers for the protection of their
common interests.
The organization of iron-ore exporting countries, first
initiated by Venezuela in 1958, and formed by countries of
Brazil, Chile, India, Liberia, Peru, and Venezuela. After a
continued decline in the price of iron-ore, the result of an
oligopoly of iron-ore buyers,1 9 3a the members believed that
their unilateral action was not enough to protect their in-
terest and that they would have to join together in order to
increase their effective control. Nevertheless, the members'
primary concern was to establish a center for the exchange of
information. The establishment of this organization was the
first producer association that was carefully considered by
exporting and importing countries as well as UNCTAD. The
UNCTAD meeting of 1966 regarding the problems of iron-ore ex-
porters concluded that "the participation of a larger number
of countries, including the main consuming countries, would
make it possible to throw much more light on many of the prob-
lems involved and partly on the fact that any international
remedial actions which might be considered desirable could be
far more effectively implemented by the joint action of a big-
ger group of exporting and importing countries than by a lim-
191. See R. Vernon, Manager in The International Econ-
omy 169-171 (19747
192. Mikdashi, supra note 24, at 89.
193. Chase Manhattan Bank, World Business Apr. 1969,
at 10, cited in Id. at 92.
193a. See statement by President of Marcona, in Robinson,
"Competition in the Sale of Iron Ore in The World Market," 11
Convencion de Ingenieros de Minas del Peru Dec. 1969 cited in
9ikdashi, supra note 24, at 106.
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ited group of exporting countries acting alone.1'194 To pro-
mote its policy, UNCTAD gathered a group of 25 developed and
developing major exporting and importing countries in Geneva
January 19-23 of 1970 to discuss the issue. The conclusion
of the meeting was disappointing. It became clear that the
problems of primary commodities were not just a problem be-
tween producers and importers but only a part of a more gen-
eral global problem between the developing and the developed
countries. 195 At this meeting the ideas of the developed-
exporting countries were close to those of the developed-
importing countries, while the developing countries again re-
mained as a separate group.19 6 The developing-importing
countries demanded the linking of the price of iron to its
final product, steel, but this was rejected by the developed
countries. The developing-producing countries also demanded
that the developed-producing countries cut back production in
their favor, which also was rejected. 197 The disappointment
as to cooperation between producers and consumers resulted
In a final decision by the exporting countries to establish
the Association of Iron Ore Exporting Countries (AIOEC) in
April 1975. This Association does not have any price fixing
power. 197a
The monopoly control by private corporations in the In-
ternational trade of bauxite has been the main impetus for the
establishment of producers' organizations. Assocalex, In-
corporated in Zurich in 1964, is the major cartel of the in-
dustry, constituting a combination of Western European and
194. UNCTAD Secretariat, "Problem of the World Market
for Iron Ore," 1966 TD/B/C.l/66 at 25, quoted in Mikdashi,
supra note 24, at 99-100.
195. UNCTAD, "International Action on Commodities in
the Light of Recent Developments," Feb. 1970, TD/B/C.l/75, at
13, cited in Mikdashi, supra note 24, at 100.
196. Id.
197. At the Third UNCTAD Meeting in 1972 the Indian
minister for foreign trade stated that "[w]e made a strong plea
for arresting erosion in export prices and the need for de-
veloped countries to stop further expansion of output so that
the competitive position of the developing nations does not get
further weakened." Quoted in Mikdashi, supra note 24, at 101.
197a. The framers of the Association are Algeria, Austra-
lia, Brazil, Chile, India, Mauritania, Renu, Sierra Leone, Swe-
den, Tunisia, and Venezuela.
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American producing enterprises. 198 These corporations, de-
spite United States antitrust laws, negotiated collectively
with the producers. One State Department official acknowl-
edged that U.S. companies entered collectively into negoti-
ation with the Jamaican government in 1973-74 for tax prob-
lems and, moreover, the United States supported such action
and "expressed to the Jamaican Government in clear terms as
we could what we thought would be the consequences of cer-
tain actions proposed by them." 19 9
After a few years of consideration, the producing coun-
tries decided to establish a permanent organization in 1974,
called the International Bauxite Association (IBA) "to pro-
mote the orderly and rational development of bauxite."'2 00
Price protection is only one purpose of the IBA; other pur-
poses include the promotion of maximum national ownership,
research, exchange of information, provision of common ser-
vices and technology. 201  IBA has also been considered a way
of checking on transnational corporations. 2 0 2 The IBA con-
trols 63% of world bauxite.203
The Union of Banana Exporting Countries is another pro-
ducer association. It was established in March 1974 in Panama
by Latin American countries, in consequence of the decline of
price of bananas since the 1950's. A report by UNCTAD showed
198. Mikdashi, "Aluminum," in R. Vernon (ed.), Big
Business and the State: Changing Relation in Western Europe
170-174 (1974).
199. "Outlook for Prices and Supplies of Industrial
Raw Materials," Hearings before the Subcom. on Economic Growth
of the Joint Economic Committee, 93rd Cong. 2nd Sess. July
1974, at 185, cited in Mikdashi, supra note 24, at 110.
200. Mikdashi, supra note 2--at 112.
201. See "Bauxite Moderate," Metal Bulletin Apr. 26,
1974, at 24, cit-ed in id. at 112.
202. Mikdashi, supra note 24, at 113.
203. The result of producer support for Jamaica has
been a raise in taxes for bauxite, and aluminum processing in-
creased its income from $25 million to $200 million in 1974.
Mikdashi, supra note 24, at 113. In addition, Jamaica entered
into partnership with foreign companies for bauxite exploita-
tion and in order to eliminate possible external jurisdiction
over its agreements withdrew from the World Bank International
Center for The Settlement of Investment Disputes. See
"Bauxite Levy Protest to World Bank," Financial Times June 26,
1974 at 29, cited in Mikdashi, supra note 24, at 11':
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that the constant decline of banana prices was in fact due to
transferral of resources from these countries to the de-
veloped countries, since the developed countries are the main
consumers of this commodity.2 0 4 The control over production
of bananas is largely in the hands of three American corpora-
tions, who also play a significant role in the politics in
these host countries. 2 0 5 The first action of the Union in
price protection was to recommend higher taxes up to 2.5
cents per pound, which resulted in a boycott from the corpora-
tion in Honduras and Panama. In general this Union is weak
and unstable. Because of the nature of the commodity and the
strategy of the corporations in playing one country against
the other, the future of the Union carries little promise of
effectiveness.
There have been other attempts to establish associations
of producers of commodities. One example is the Uranium In-
stitute, set up in April 1975.206 In contrast with other pro-
ducers' associations, which are governmental, this association
consists of private corporations supported by their governments.
In fact, governmental policies are promoted and implemented by
these private corporations. Another important characteristic
of this association is that the home countries of its members
are developed countries.
The concern for cooperation among the exporters of
uranium began with Australia and Canada for the purpose of
price control. Later the private producers in Australia, Can-
ada, France, South Africa and the United Kingdom negotiated
with respect to prices at a meeting in Johannesburg in May
1972. The mutual interest of the producers ultimately led to
the formulation of the Uranium Institute, with the participa-
204. UNCTAD, "Pricing Policy in Relation to Marketing
and Distribution of Bananas" TD/B/C. I/CONFS 1O/L.5 at 5,
May 7 (1974). For studies on marketing and distribution of
bananas see TD/B/C. 1/163, on Cocoa see TD/B/C/l/164; on
manganese ore see TD/B/C. 169, Tungsten TD/B/C. l/Tungsten/14;
on rubber, TD/B/C.4/60/Rev.l on Jute, TD/B/C.4/85. See UCTAD,
"Proportion between Export Prices and Consumer Prices-of
Selected Commodities Exported by Developing Countries," TD/
184/Supp. 3. Jan. 14, 1967.
205. The production of bananas is controlled by three
American corporations, United Brands (35%), Standard Fruit
(25%), and Del Monte (19%). These companies were also in-
volved in political activities and pressure in Latin American
countries. See "Multinationals: A Banana Brouhaha"; "Other
Nations to Meet on other Resources," N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1974,
at 5 cited in Mikdashi, supra note 24, at 115.
206. Bus. Week Aug. 18, 1975, at 32.
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tion of sixteen enterprises. The United States government and
its producers did not participate in this meeting but supported
the cooperation among the producers and price control. The
principal concern of this Institute, however, is the control of
nuclear energy for multiple purposes. This concern is shared
by such other nuclear exporters as the United Kingdom, Canada,
France, West Germany, Soviet Union and Japan. While there
have been some indications that the United States favors monop-
oly over the reprocessing market, there are also some fears
that such monopoly over the whole uranium industry might cre-
ate special problems in the nuclear age. One writer has feared
that such monopoly might create another OPEC.2 0 7
The effects of these partially inclusive intergovern-
mental organizations upon the desired global policy of opti-
malization of common interests are no less important than the
conditions of their emergence. The most controversial effects
derive from OPEC. There have been claims that the higher
prices of oil have caused or contributed substantially to world
Inflation, and that the basic effect of OPEC pricing has been
merely the transfer of wealth to oil producers at the expense
of others. Furthermore, some 30 developing countries suffered
more than the developed-consuming countries, because the de-
veloping-consuming countries must use energy for their essen-
tial growth projects and cannot therefore cut back their im-
ports, while the developed countries consume enough energy for
comfort to be able to cut back without significant damage to
their economy. The Economist reported in 1973 that "the rise
in the underdeveloped countries' oil bill will just about wipe
out the whole official aid effort of the United States, equal
to 25 percent of the foreign currency that the rich world now
hands to the poor . . . . The poor nations will have more rea-
son to resent the Arabs' tactics when the recession loosening
over the West causes commodity prices to slump. It is only in
the unprecedented boom of the past year that commodity prices
have come back to what they were in the 1950's . .,,206 Less
than two weeks after this report the price of many commodities
began to tumble, for example, copper by 20% and zinc by 33%.209
The industrialized countries argue that the high prices
of raw materials, and especially of oil, must lead to economic
207. Lewis, "Uranium Enrichment: Bid for a Big Market,"
Financial Times July 17, 1975, at 4, cited in Mikdashi, supra
at 109-110.
208. The Economist Dec. 8, 1973, quoted in Hansen, "The
Politics of Scarcity," in J. Howe (ed.), The U.S. and the De-
veloping World: Agenda for Action 63(1974).
209. Howe at 63.
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depression, with worldwide adverse effects even upon the pro-
ducers themselves. 2 10 It is also said that because of high
oil prices deficits of the developed countries, as a group,
have increased in 1974 from $17 billion to $61 billion, with
the UK, Japan and Italy being the most affected.2 1 To the
contrary, it has been argued that it is too narrow an ap-
proach to blame oil prices, or higher prices of other com-
modities, as the principal cause for world inflation.2 12 So
narrow an approach tends to neglect the fundamental deteriora-
tion in world economic structures, including both IMF and
GATT.2 13 The higher prices of oil may have contributed to
world inflation, but it is naive to argue that they were the
sole cause. If inflation had otherwise remained at the level
of pre-1971, international trade would have had no problem.
The OPEC members can be criticized mostly for not adopting
adequate strategies to protect the interests of, or at least
to minimize the adverse effect of oil prices upon, the de-
veloping countries. The higher oil prices cost the developing
countries most of the $11 billion which they received for de-
velopment purposes in 1974. The report of the Bank of Inter-
national Settlements estimated that the developing countries'
overall deficit, after the rise of oil prices, increased three
times more than before the oil crisis to $30 billion. Such
inadequate protection provided by OPEC for the developing-
210. See President Ford's address to the UN General
Assembly, Sept. 18, 1974, in A/PV 2234, and Secretary of State
Kissinger's address to the UN General Assembly, Sixth Special
Session, UN Doc. A/PV 2214. The fact that inflation would
hurt producing nations has been recognized by the producers
themselves. See Levy, 'World Oil Cooperation or International
Chaos," 52 For- n Affairs 690 (1974).
211. 14 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 263 (1974)
cited in Kaplan, "International Economic Organizations: Oil
and Money," 17 Harv. Int'l L.J. 203, 205 (1976).
212. See generally Nordhaus, "The Allocation of Energy
Resources,"Cowles Foundation paper No. 401 (Yale Univ.) (1974).
213. See Kaplan, sp note 211, at 203-248. On the
inadequacy ofTIF see Triflin, "The International Monetary Sys-
tem," in New Structures for Economic Independence UN, A/PV.2335,
at 60 and 56; Howe, "The Developing Countries in a Changing In-
ternational Economic Order: A Survey of Research Needs," in
C. Bergsten (ed.), The Future of the International Economic Or-
der: An Agenda for Research 167 (1975), and see the non-aligned
countries' Aug. 1976 meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka, "Third World
Speakout" in N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1976.
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consuming countries has been noted by the developing countries
themselves. 2 14
3. Inclusive Competence Over Pricing
By the exercise of inclusive competence we refer to the
making and applying of authoritative policies by a number of
states. This assertion of competence with which we are here
concerned, differs from those we have been examining above,
not so much in the number of participants, as in the charac-
teristics of the participants and their shared purposes. These
agreements enable producers and consumers to search for a com-
mon policy in pricing. The diversity in representation of in-
terests creates a situation with higher potential for the shar-
ing of effective power in the promotion of common interest. In
other words, the outcomes of such exercises of inclusive com-
petence are more likely also to be inclusive.
a. Commodity Agreements
Chronic surpluses, excessive price fluctuation and
wasteful methods of exploitation of primary materials, which
in times of crisis sometimes reached unmanageable stages, made
resort to inter-governmental agreements to regulate the ex-
change of commodities inevitable. The economic chaos after
World War I and increases in agricultural production in coun-
tries not involved In the war left the world with a persstent
surplus of some crops for which there was no adequate market. 2 15
This situation gave governments no choice other than to in-
crease their competence to participate in the pricing of com-
modities to protect their common interests more effectively.
Attempts to regulate pricing through inter-governmental
214. Mason, su a note 63 at 85. UN, Review of Inter-
national Commodity Problems, prepared for International Com-
modity Organization, 1949, at 1.
215. J. Rowe, Markets and Men: Study of Artificial Con-
trol Schemes in some primary industries (195U). There were two
basic causes for the emergence of unmanageable raw material
surpluses in the interwar period. The first was the rapid and
continuous flow of technological improvements in commodity
production throughout all parts of the world. The second was
the rise of economic and particularly of agricultural nation-
alism. Europe and British dependence on imported food de-
creased by governmental encouragement for security purposes.
This planning caused the problem of surpluses of raw materials
for producing countries. Id. at 150-151.
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agreements began in the 1920's.216 Since 1927 the potential
of commodity agreements has been widely recognized.2 17 The
World Economic Conference of 1927 in its Final Report ex-
pressed the necessity for inclusive participation in regu-
lating commodities.2 18 The United Nations Conference on Trade
and Employment which promulgated the Havana Charter for an In-
ternational Trade Organization in 1948 was another formal recog-
nition of international commodity agreements. Moreover, the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations adopted in
its resolution in 1951219 Chapter VI of the Havana Charter
dealing with such agreements. A principal reason for the en-
couragement of these agreements was to oppose indirectly the
effective power of producers' cartels designed basically to
promote their own interests. Commodity agreements would seem
a more appropriate means for regulating the pricing process in
the common interest, because they represent the interests of
both producers and consumers.
International commodity agreements afford strategies for
securing multiple purposes, such as stabilizing the market, in-
creasing export earnings, securing the supply of goods, con-
trolling production, and even promoting conservation of re-
sources. One of the principal problems in commodity agree-
ments is the reasonable accommodation of these different pur-
poses. Article 57 of the Havana Charter defines the objectives
of commodity agreements as follows:
(a) to prevent or alleviate the serious economic
difficulties which may arise when adjustments be-
tween production and consumption cannot be ef-
fected by normal market forces alone as rapidly
as the circumstances require;
ici to prevent or moderate pronounced fluctuations
in the price of a primary commodity with a view to
achieving a reasonable degree of stability on a
basis of such prices as are fair to consumers and
provide a reasonable return to producers, having
regard to the desirability of securing long-term
equilibrium between the forces of supply and de-
mand;
216. H. Johnson, Economic Policies Toward Less De-
veloped Countries 138. For a study of commodities before
World War II, see P. Yates, Commodity Control (1943).
217. Hager, supra note 48, at 309.
218. United Nations International Labour Office, Inter-
governmental Commodity Agreements at xviii.
219. Resolution 373 VIII, Sept. 13, 1951.
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ifi to assure the equitable distribution of
primary commodity in short supply.2 2 0
This definition of basic objectives reflects the problems be-
setting the global economic process after World War II--most
importantly, the problems of burdensome surpluses and of spe-
cial difficulties in production and trade in particular com-
modities. The concern of the member-states was focused most-
ly on immediate, short-term problems. Their basic objective
was to facilitate trade. The dominant role of the United
States in the War was also reflected in the Conference in
that the concept of free trade was made the testing measure
of the adequacy of regulations. All recommendations were re-
quired to meet the criterion of "free trade."
The first reactions to international commodity agree-
ments were positive. The report on Measures For Internation-
al Economic Stability, prepared by a group of experts ap-
pointed by the United Nations in 1951-1952, gave significant
emphasis to commodity agreements "as one of the instruments
for achieving economic stability."2 2 1 The 1951 Conference
of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Na-
tions expressed its belief that "commodity control agreements,
as defined in Chapter VI of the Havana Charter, could con-
tribute towards stabilizing international markets for agri-
cultural commodities."'2 2 2
Despite this wide support by governments of interna-
tional commodity agreements as an appropriate way of pro-
tecting the common interest,2 2 3 the Havana Charter did not
accomplish much. In the first four years after the Charter
was writt n, only the International Wheat Agreement was con-
cluded.2 2 A United Nations Study on Commodity Problems re-
ported the reasons for the lack of agreements. Among the
major reasons were the general financial problems surrounding
the producers and consumers. These financial problems could
not have been solved by commodity agreements alone. For ex-
220. Havana Charter art. 57.
221. Review of International Commodity Problems (Re-
port of UN Interim--Coordinating Committee for International
Commodity Agreement) (1952), at I.
222. Id.
223. Ialker, "The International Law of Commodity Agree-
ments," 28 L. & Contemp. Prob. 394 (1963).
224. UN Review, supra note 221, at 5-6.
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ample, one of the critical financial problems related to cur-
rency difficulties. As a result of the shortage of particu-
lar currencies, some countries were not able to obtain all
their requirements of certain commodities, even though sup-
plies were available in other currency areas? 2 5 This situation
caused variation in prices for the same commodity agreements
because shortages in currencies made it difficult for some
countries to give long-term commitments to purchase commodi-
ties from certain areas. To solve these financial problems,
governments engaged in bilateral negotiations for commodity
arrangements which were outside the scope of the Havana
Charter and were generally regarded as "short-term 2 easures
designed to meet special post-war circumstances. '
'2 26
Against this background, the developing countries have
faced a continuing external imbalance which has become more
acute as their demands for development projects have risen.
Their requirements for imported capital and other development
needs have tended to rise at a faster rate than their export
income.2 2 7 The need for helping developing countries to over-
come these problems received considerable recognition by the
United Nations Sub-Commission on Economic Development, the
regional economic commissions of the United Nations, and the
Economic and Social Council. This recognition, however, did
not lead to direct and effective action until 1964, with the
establishment of UNCTAD.228
225. UN Review (1949) at 4.
226. Id. Many of those bilateral agreements were con-
cluded to obtain urgently needed imports.
227. UN, 'The Development of a Commodity Policy," TD/
B/C.1/25 Mar. 9, 1967.
228. Concern for the economic development of develop-
ing countries, however, began in 1952 when the General Assem-
bly passed Resolution 623 VII, entitled "Financing of Economic
Development through the Establishment of Fair and Equitable
International Prices for Primary Commodities and Through the
Execution of National Programs of Integrated Economic Develop-
ment." This resolution recommended that:
Whenever governments adopt measures affecting the
prices of primary commodities entering internation-
al trade, they should duly consider the effect of
such measures on the terms of trade of countries
in the process of development in order to ensure
that the prices of primary commodities are kept in
an adequate, just and equitable relation to the
prices of capital goods and other manufactured arti-
cles so as to permit the more satisfactory formation
of domestic savings in the countries in the process
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In the UNCTAD Conference of 1964 in Geneva, more than
2,000 representatives of 120 countries challenged the trade
policies of the 1950's and early 1960's. In an effort to give
a new direction to international economic structures and pro-
cesses, a new objective of commodity agreements was defined as
"stimulating a dynamic and steady growth and ensuring reason-
able predictability in the real export earnings of the develop-
ing countries so as to provide them with expanding resources
for their economic and social development, while taking into
account the interests of consumers in importing countries,
through remunerative, equitable and stable prices for primary
commodities, having due regard to their import purchasing
power, assured satisfactory access and increased imports con-
sumption, as well as coordination of production and marketing
policies."2 29 It was clear that the main issue was no longer
"burdensome surpluses" or price fluctuation. The group of
seventy-seven poor nations called for more access to the markets
of developed countries, preferential treatment, and use of com-
modity agreements to increase the producers' incomes, as well
as stability in prices. In other words, the UNCTAD majority
moved from price stabilization to "price augmentation." 2 30
UNCTAD concluded that
[tihe case for involving an integrated com-
modity policy is seen to arise from three con-
trol considerations. First, commodity poli-
cies must have a major positive role in the
broader context of facilitating the economic
development of the developing countries.
Second, this role must arise from conscious
and coordinated action taken over both short
and long term, and by developed and developing
countries alike. Finally the attainment of
specified development objectives for the de-
veloping world would be of economic and so-
cial benefit to the international community
as a whole.2 3l
of development and to facilitate the establish-
ment of fair wage levels for the working popula-
tions of these countries with view to rescuing
the existing disparity between their standards
of living and those in the highly industrial-
ized countries.
229. UNCTAD, Proceedings, Final Act and Report, Vol. I
1964 at 12; J. Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development 267 (1967).
230. Hager, spra note 48, at 310.
231. UN, TD/-7'T-/26 Mar. 9, 1967, at 3. In voting on
the principles adopted by UNCTAD, the United States was alone
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The change in the objectives of the commodity agreements pro-
posed by UNCTAD, was, however, far from being achieved in
practice. In fact the comprehensive and multiple goals of
commodity agreements were not recognized in practice.2 32
In a commodity agreement, production, export and stocks
are the three main elements which play important roles in con-
trol of pricing. These elements are employed in three types
of commodity agreements: "quota scheme or export quotas,"
"buffer-stock," and "multilateral contract agreements." Ex-
port quotas restrict the volume of trade. They are designed
to maintain prices at or near a desired level by means of fix-
ing market supply, while satisfying demand. The International
Sugar Agreement of 1968, the International Coffee Agreement of
1968 and the International Cocoa Agreement of 1972 are exam-
ples of this category of commodity agreements.2 3 3 The success
of export quotas depends on the membership of the major ex-
porting and importing countries in the agreements. Export
quotas are generally designed for price support and It is
claimed that producers who employ export quotas show a natural
tendency to disregard the interest of consumers. Higher prices
and low volume are generally preferred to larger volume and low
prices.234 Furthermore, an export quota system operates more
effectively in a state-supported trading regime than in a
private trading regime.
Changes in prices hinge upon not only supply and demand
but also on market forces. A buffer-stock regime supports the
stabilized pricing system through purchases or sales of stocks
in voting against the General Principles, which called for "re-
spect for the principle of sovereign equality of states, self-
determination of peoples, and non-interference in the internal
affairs of their countries; . . . to help to promote in de-
veloping countries a rate of growth consistent with the need to
bring about substantial and steady increase in . . . [their] in-
come in order to narrow the gap between the standard of living
in developing countries and that in the developed countries."
The United States also opposed many other basic recommendations
of the UNCTAD meeting, while she was accompanied by some other
developed countries in a few of them.
232. See Fawcett, "The Function of Law in International
Commodity Agreements," 44 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 157, 160 (1970).
233. For International Sugar Agreement see UN Doc. TD/
Sugar, 7/12 (1968); for International Coffee Agreement see "In-
ternational Coffee Agreement," 7 Int'l Legal Mat. 237 (1968),
and for International Cocoa Agreement see UN Doc. TD/Cocoa 3/9
(1972).
234. E. Mason, Controlling World Trade 143 (1946).
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when prices go down or above the agreed price. This system
challenges unfavorable market forces through its control of
stocks. The Fourth International Tin Agreement of 1970 was
an example of this kind of commodity agreement. 2 3 5
Multilateral agreements for buffer-stocks require the
ability to forecast future price trends. In such agreements,
producers agree to export a certain portion of the commodity
and importers agree to purchase within a stated price range.
They agree that in time of shortage the price may not go above
a stated price and in time of surplus it may not go below a
minimum price. This regime of control is not popular In in-
ternational trade, and the only example of sucH an agreement
Is the Wheat Agreement, beginning in 1949 and continuing
through successive agreements.
The participants in international commodity agreements
include both producing and consuming countries, other in-
terested governments, and sometimes certain specialized agen-
cies of the United Nations. Generally agreements permit volun-
tary withdrawal of members provided that a member gives ad-
vance notice (Cocoa Agreement Art. 71, Coffee Agreement Art.
66 and Sugar Agreement Art. 67). Some agreements, such as the
Wheat and Tin Agreements, require valid reasons for withdrawal.
The participants may change their positions from exporter to
importer or vice versa (Art. 5 of Tin Agreement) or participate
as both Importer and exporter, as is the position of the Euro-
pean Economic Community in the Wheat Agreement (Art. 10 of
Wheat Trade Convention). Intergovernmental organizations may
be permitted to participate in international commodity agree-
ments, sometimes as observers with no voting power or, again,
with voting power in special circumstances (Art. 50 of Tin
Agreement and Art. 4 of Cocoa Agreement). Participation by
private organizations has not yet been generally accepted in
international commodity agreements, since such agreements are
considered to be governmental activities. Only the Cocoa Agree-
ment (Art. 13) and the Sugar Agreement (Art. 12) contain clauses
with respect to participation by private associations.
International commodity agreements may restrict trade
exchange of members outside the agreement, and between members
and non-members in terms of restrictions on imports from or ex-
ports to non-members. Member-states are required to provide
the organization with necessary information for effective oper-
ation (Cocoa Agreement, Art. 3). Members are also responsible
for providing financial assistance to the organization and are
bound by decisions of the organization under the terms of the
agreement (Cocoa Agreement, Art. 12).
235. UN Doc. TD/Tin.4/7/Rev. 1 (1970).
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International commodity agreements commonly provide for
a Council, an Executive Committee and a Secretariat. The Coun-
cil is the policy-making body of the organization. Producers
and importers have equal voting power in the Council. Usually
decisions by the Council are made by a simple majority; in
some cases a two-third majority is required. The Executive
Committee consists of both producer and importer countries,
and its duties and powers are determined by the Council. The
function of the Secretariat is to administer the agreement in
accordance with policies established by the Council.
The achievements of commodity agreements during the past
three decades have generally been disappointing in comparison
with expectations and general community goals for development.
It has been realized that commodity agreements by themselves
are not adequate strategies to protect the common interest of
the larger community. It would appear that commodity agree-
ments must be incorporated into a much larger system of eco-
nomic support of developing countries.23 6 A different posi-
tion is taken by some observers, such as Metzger who disap-
proves of a comprehensive role for commodity agreements and be-
lieves that developing countries should "devote their energies,
collectively, to securing greater amounts of foreign aid . . .
and dismantling of protectionism by developed countries, and
individually, to internal societal transformations at home."2 3 7
236. Johnson, supra note 216, at 5: M. Radetzki, Inter-
national Commodity Market Agreements 24-25 (1970). See also
UNCTAD, TD/184 Mar. 4, 1976.
237. Metzger, "Law and Policy Making for Trade Among
'Have-' and 'Have-Not' Nations," in J. Carey (ed.), Law and Pol-
icy Making for Trade Among "Have" and "Have-Not" Nations 39
(1968) and J. Rowe, Primary Commodities in International Trade
215-216 (1965). Stanley Metzger, arguing against the demand of
using commodity agreements for redistribution of values, claims
that this change in the conception of commodity agreements have
consequent effects in several respects. The first effect is
the identification of commodity agreements as "aid mechanism"
whether supplementary to or in substitution of direct financial
assistance, in the forms of loans or grants. Then the question
is whether they are an efficient means of aid-giving or "disas-
trous to the world's economy and to the growth of the world's
wealth at the maximum rate." Metzger joins the economists who
believe that it is an essential economic principle that the
prices should be related to the cost of production, otherwise
resources are being wasted somehow, and that a policy of trade
which is based on artificially high prices of resources is based
on wasting resources. The second effect of changing the concept
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Some economists, on the other hand, react more favorably to
the use of commodity agreements as a means of increasing the
foreign revenue of developing countries for their develop-
ment programs.238 Thus, Isaiah Frank in describing the role
of pricing says:
[lit is proper to regard international
price-fixing agreements as a form of aid,
since they are a disguised means of taxing
consumers in the developed countries in or-
der to provide resources to the low income
countries--resources which the governments
of those countries can, at least potentially,
mobilize for purposes of development ....
[l1f the advanced countries were to earmark
for development assistance a 2 percent tax on
imports of all commodities from all sources,
it would yield over $2 billion, a sum equal
to an aid to less developed countries. More-
over, because the trade of advanced countries
has been increasing rapidly, the yield of the
tax would rise by about 9 percent annually.2 39
Similarly, Michael Hager observes that behind all the criti-
cisms of this role of commodity agreements is the efficiency
argument.240 Under "micro-economic theory, monopoly pricing
of commodity agreements in Metzger's view is that the new con-
ception would narrow even more severely the possible number
of commodities which might be considered for eventual agree-
ments of the true "stabilizing type."
238. See, for example, Frank, "New Perspectives on
Trade and Development" 45 Foreign Affairs Apr. 1967, at 528-
529. Pincus, supra note 29 at 267-264; Hager, supra note 48,
at 317-325.
239. See Frank, id.
240. Hager, suprra--note 48, at 318. The efficiency ar-
gument is based on the assumption that resources not used in
production of primary resources will be used in other develop-
ment processes. Hager argues that 'while this use of resources
in development process other than production of primary re-
sources may be true in complex industrial societies, it is not
necessarily so in poor countries. There the capacity to diver-
sify may depend upon further development." ECOSOC has also
recognized this problem:
If a persistent movement indicates the need for
some structural adjustment this may have to be ap-
proached in a more positive manner, with Govern-
ments actively assisting factors to more produc-
tive employment. This poses particularly difficult
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wastes economic resources, generates excess capacity, and
leads to higher average costs than are technologically
necessary."2 4 1 Hager rejects this efficiency argument as
the sole criterion for appraising international commodity
agreements. He emphasizes growth, stability and equitable
value distribution as basic goals for such agreements. This
attitude has of course been supported by the developing coun-
tries. They demand a more comprehensive role for commodity
agreements--their policies should be accompanied with preferen-
tial treatment of their exports of manufactured and semi-
processed goods.2 42 They demand that commodity agreements
should become part of, and be related to, a new structure of
international economic order. They are regarded as indis-
pensable to the new order being demanded.
b. The New Economic Order
The most inclusive policies concerning the pricing
process have been formulated and adopted by the General As-
sembly of the United Nations in the Resolution of May 1, 1974
on a Declaration (3201. S-VI), and a Program of Action (3202.
S-VI) on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
adopted a few months later by the 29th regular session of the
General Assembly in conjunction with the two above resolu-
tions, expresses demands of the vast majority of the United
Nations members for reconstruction of the global economy. The
ultimate approval of the General Assembly of these documents
created the first policy statement participated In by the
widest number of states as decision-makers. Regardless of
some reservations about specific issues of these resolutions
by the developed countries, the overall reform proposal has
won almost global acceptance.
The New Economic Order (NEO) recommended by the resolu-
tions expands the competence of nation-states in economic
activities with regard to increase production and a more equi-
table distribution of values. The basic emphasis on the ex-
problems in underdeveloped countries in which
alternative uses for resources may in short
run be very few and in the longer run require
a good deal of complementary investment.
ECOSOC, UNCTAD Proceeding; 3 Commodity Trade at 83.
241. R. Dorfman, The Price System 9b (1964).
242. Midesell, "Commodity Agreements and Aid to De-
veloping Countries," 28 Law. & Contemp. Prob. 294 (1963). For
proposals for changing commodity agreements see Keynes, "The
International Control of Raw Materials" 4 J. Int'l Eco. 299-
315 (1974).
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pansion of such competence has been effected through pro-
motion of the concept of "permanent sovereignty over natural
resources." NEO calls for competence of states in national-
ization or transfer of ownership of their economic institutions
to their nationals, regulation and supervision of the activi-
ties of transnational corporations, and strengthening of bar-
gaining power through collective action in the form of parti-
cipation In regional economic groups and producers' associ-
ations. The NEO furthermore calls for "just and equitable re-
lationship between the prices of raw materials, primary
products, manufactured and semi-manufactured goods exported
by developing countries and the prices of raw materials, pri-
mary commodities, manufactures, capital goods and equipment
Imported by them with the aim of bringing about sustained im-
provement in their unsatisfactory terms of trade and the ex-
pansion of the world economy." It demands the protection of
raw materials from the competition of synthetic substitutes.
Among the large number of demands for changes, NEO demands
preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing
countries wherever feasible, securing favorable conditions
for the transfer of financial resources and technology to de-
veloping countries, and fundamental changes in the Interna-
tional Monetary System, General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
and United Nations.
The United States as speaker for a limited number of de-
veloped market economy countries opposing the NEO, has empha-
sized that there is no need for structural changes in the in-
ternational economic order and efforts should be concentrated
on adjustment of the present system. The United States Am-
bassador, Mr. Scali, referred to NEO as a "significant politi-
cal document" that does not represent unanimity of opinion in
the General Assembly. Secretary of State Kissinger in an ad-
dress to the Ministerial meeting to the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development in Paris in May 1975 said
that the issue of global development is not the only subject
of the NEO and its issues go far beyond economic considera-
tions. The American view, however, was not shared to the same
degree by its European allies. Prime Minister Uyl of the
Netherlands in an address to an international symposium on the
Seventh Special Session on May 23, 1975, stated that he could
not agree that the growth of the gross world product over the
last three decades has been enormous, but at the same time he
said, "we have witnessed failures as a result of today's sys-
tem . . . the uneven distribution of income between States and
within countries . . . increasing destruction of our environ-
ment . . . and a threatening scarcity of resources, caused by
unlimited exploitation." Mr. Uyl, referring to the funda-
mental problems of present institutions, emphasized that the
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present system was not a free market system and that these
problems would not be solved by marginal changes. The repre-
sentative of Finland, Aarno Karhilo, while making it clear
that some of the provisions of the resolutions would cause
obvious problems for his country, expressed the full support
of his government of NEO.
Regardless of early predictions about NEO regarding it
as a political maneuver for short-term interest and with
short-term effects, NEO became the major goal and center of
attention of the vast majority of nation-states. The collec-
tive and unilateral actions of states for the implementation
of NEO have been increasing the community expectations about
the effectiveness of NEO policies as authoritative presump-
tions. The General Assembly's Seventh Special Session on De-
velopment and International Economic Cooperation ended on
September 16, 1975, and requested a number of Institutions to
study and formulate detailed proposals for the implementation
of general policies for a new economic structure. UNCTAD has
become the main director of these studies. After one year of
constant studying and discussions on its Fourth Meeting In
Nairobi (1976), UNCTAD proposed an integrated program which is
the most comprehensive formula on reconstruction of the pro-
cess of value distribution more compatible with present ex-
pectations and the general community goals for development.
c. The Integrated Program
The inadequacy and incompatibility of the conventional
approach to commodity agreements for fulfillment of the needs
of the present world economy have stimulated a more widely in-
clusive approach to this issue. Attempts to regulate commodity
markets through international agreements have remained largely
unsuccessful. Only five international commodity agreements--
relating to wheat, sugar, tin, coffee and cocoa--have been
concluded; among these only the agreements for cocoa, tin and
coffee have been successfully renegotiated. Much of the dif-
ficulty has stemmed from the traditional approach which denies
government a role, save in exceptional cases, in the regula-
tion of commodity markets and which insists that the appropri-
ate function of pricing is "the control of fluctuations rather
than the reversal or modification of long-term trends as deter-
mined by the forces of the market."2 43 Such attitudes toward
commodities affected the negotiation of the International
Cocoa Agreement, for example, which took seventeen years to
243. UNCTAD IV, "New Directions and New Structures for
Trade and Development," TD/183 at 19 (1976).
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reach agreement.24
4
The third session of UNCTAD in 1972 initiated "in-
tensive intergovernmental consultations" concerning 13 com-
modities on a case-by-case basis, but no proposal at this
session could resolve the major differences between producers
and consumers. Some of the main problems are "weakness in
motivation on the part of the consumers and a lack of capacity
on the part of producers to command attention to their
needs."2 45 For the consuming countries, the Report continues,
"there was a strong disinclination to establish governmental
intervention to 'free' markets--a disinclination born of a
system and an ideology which reflects the dominance of private
interest."2 4 5a The study by UNCTAD IV shows that while both
producers and consumers have a common interest in avoiding
sharp price fluctuations, their interest is not quite the
same, because commodities include a much smaller portion of
the trade of consumers than of producers.2 4 6 The study criti-
cizes the case-by-case approach to commodity issues, since it
tends to focus on the economic interests of the consuming coun-
tries as buyers and gives too little attention to the broader
Issues of international development policies. The purely eco-
nomic aspects of the agreements are too often allowed to over-
shadow the preferred outcome of optimization of development
goals. Against this background, the traditional commodity ap-
proach for developing countries has given no assurance of ade-
quate growth in their foreign exchange for their primary com-
modities.
The inadequacy of inherited thought for formulating and
implementing effective development programs has led to demands
for a new approach to commodity issues. An important item in
the Program of Action of the New International Economic Order
requested studies and reform proposals in commodity issues com-
patible with the policies of the NEO. After one year of study
UNCTAD IV recommended a new approach to commodity problems:
a broad approach referred to as the "integrated program" which
would "constitute a break with past approaches by introducing
an important element of global resource management in the in-
terests of the development process, as well as promoting a more
orderly evolution of commodity supply in the interests of the
world economy as a whole."'247 The integrated program is de-




247. WMCTAD IV, "Commodities," TD/184 at 3 (1976).
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signed to secure not a mere negotiation or consultation In a
narrow and isolated case-by-case approach to commodities, but
rather an intensive inter-governmental consultation to secure
an international consensus on a wide range of products through
a decision process which takes into account all essential fac-
tors. The integrated program is also supplemented by comple-
mentary measures which deal specifically with the problem of
preserving and improving the purchasing power of the commodity
exports of the countries of the third world. The more spe-
cific objectives of the Integrated program, besides expansion
of research and development and production and consumption of
resources, are:
(a) Establishment and maintenance of commodity
prices at levels which, in real terms, are
equitable to consumers and remunerative to need
to producers, taking full account of the rate of
world inflation, the need to provide incentives
for adequate investment in commodity production,
the depletion of non-renewable resources and the
need to keep the prices of natural commodities
competitive with those of their synthetic sub-
stitutes;
(b) Reduction of excessive fluctuations In com-
modity prices and the volume of trade, taking ac-
count of the special importance of this objective
in the cases of essential foodstuffs and natural
products facing competition from stable-priced
substitutes;
(c) Assurance of access to markets, especially
those of developed countries, for commodity ex-
porting countries;
(d) Assurance of access to supplies of primary
commodities for importing countries, with par-
ticular attention to assured supplies of food
aid and other essential raw materials;
(e) Expansion of the processing of primary com-
modities in developing countries;
(f) Improvement of the competitiveness of
natural products vis-1-vis synthetics;
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(g) Restructuring, or rationalization, as
appropriate, of the marketing and distribu-
tion system.248
I. The Main Policies of the Integrated Program
The integrated program covers a wide range of commodi-
ties, important in the external trade of the developing coun-
tries. The decisions as to what commodities are to be covered
are intergovernmental. The UNCTAD Secretariat presented a list
of seventeen commodities important to developing countries.
These commodities account for about three quarters of their
agricultural and mineral exports other than petroleum. The de-
veloped countries also have a substantial interest in inter-
national markets for these commodities. Ten of these commodi-
ties--cocoa, coffee, copper, cotton, jute, rubber, sisal, sugar,
tea and tin--account for 75 percent of the exports of all seven-
teen commodities.2 49 The seventeen commodities are storable
products suitable for stock investment schemes, and there are
proposals for a common fund for financing stocks. The trend in
the real value of exports of the ten commodities referred to
as the ten "core" commodities was almost zero or negative over
the period of 1953-1972.250 The list of seventeen commodities,
however, is not exclusive and governmental decisions may change
the list.
The goals of protection against price fluctuations, of
assurance of adequate supplies at any time, and of effecting
the disposal of production on the basis of a realistic estimate
of demand, all require the establishment and operation of in-
ternational stocks. The idea of using stock has been employed
effectively, except in the agreements as to tin and cocoa. Re-
sistance to using stocks derives from an ideology that rejects
government interference with the market system, and the lack of
finance for international stock-trading. Even if a stock oper-
ation is possible, it can be successful only if it is employed
in combination with policies concerning the expansion of pro-
duction and consumption, improvement of marketing and distribu-
tion, and softening export regulation.251
The major difficulty that international stock-dealing
faces is in securing the necessary financial support. In the
past the operation of stocks has depended upon the financial
situation of the producers. Past experience also shows that
248. Id. at '.
249. '-r the list of these commodities see TD/184,
table 1.
250. Id.
251. T'D/183, at 27.
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funding available to stocking operations has been Inadequate.
To solve this problem in the operation of an International
stock-trading, the integrated program proposes to set up a
common fund. The function of the common fund will be to lend
money, under appropriate conditions, to commodity organiza-
tions operating international stocks, The terms of the agree-
ment would be filled by negotiations with individual commodity
organizations, and the organization is obliged to repay the
fund. It has been estimated that the establishing of a common
fund, for the ten "core" commodities including some allowance
for other commodities, with the exception of grains, would re-
quire aggregate capital of $3 billion. One third of the $3
billion could be provided as paid-up risk capital and the rest
as loans. Similarly, governments would be expected to under-
take a $3 billion commitment, out of which $1 billion would be
on call and $2 billion as loans. These government commitments
would be used for crisis situations; when the original fund
cannot meet the demand, the government fund would prevent the
distribution of the operation of stocks. It has been sug-
gested that the fund should be paid both by commodity ex-
porters and commodity importers. Some countries with special
situations, such as the petroleum exporters, could contribute
long-term loans to the common fund. On the other hand, some
developing countries, referred to as the least developed coun-
tries, might be given special treatment such as exemption of
their financial responsibilities to the common fund.252
The situation for non-storable commodities is rather
different. The protection of these commodities cannot be
limited to stock operation, and other measures such as "supply
management by producers," and "multilateral trade commitments"
by both producers and consumers may be employed in conjunction
with stocks whenever feasible.2 5 3 Export quotas could be a
useful technique for management of supply. The program In-
cludes a uniform ad valorem export tax or minimum export price
scheme, and cooperation in investment plans as other useful
techniques of supply management. Multilateral commitments al-
so assure the long-term planning of resource use and invest-
ment.
The final main theme of the integrated program is the
establishment of compensatory financing of export fluctuations.
The integrated program does not exclude the possibilities of
252. For a detailed discussion of criteria for deter-
mining the contribution of different countries, see TD/B/C.I/
196 and Add. 1.
253. TD/184, at 11-12.
(VOL. 3
1977] INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OVER THE PRICING OF RESOURCES 329
decrease in earnings of individual countries, regardless of
the efforts for the stabilization of prices, One of those
possibilities, for example, is the adverse effect caused by
poor crops. Therefore, to have a system of compensatory
financing in the context of an integrated program is neces-
sary for the promotion of development goals. The necessity
of this program is particularly important with respect to
inefficient IMF facilities, at least up to the end of 1975.
Only the recent liberalization of IMF facilities in 1976, by
providing a $1 billion fund and introducing more flexible pro-
cedures, has afforded some possibilities in such assistance
to developing countries. In general the structure of IMF
does not seem to be adequate for such purposes. The inte-
grated program, however, relates the establishment of com-
pensatory financing to the willingness of the governments to
provide compensatory loans, and to their preferences for amend-
ing the IMF for establishing a new structural arrangement.
The impact of the integrated program on developing-
importing countries has been carefully considered. There are
twenty developing net importing countries. Thirteen of them
have a relatively high income or fast growth in their export
earnings.254 For the rest, seven developing net importing
countries, the import problem is food deficit. The increase
in the price of food since 1972 has caused more economic
problems because of the shift of more foreign earnings to
food supply. The alternative which the Integrated program
provides for these countries includes: "(i) agreements to as-
sure the availability of basic food imports at reasonable
prices, or the provision of food aid, for the countries con-
cerned; (ii) provisions in ihdividual commodity agreements for
the supply of commodities on concessional terms to such coun-
tries; and (iii) relief for such countries from financial or
other burdens arising from the operation of international
stocks or of the proposed common fund." 2 55 The integrated pro-
gram, however, recognizes that the Inadequacy of the remedial
measures designed for the protection of the developing import-
ing countries and a need for further study and consideration.
ii. Complementary Policies of the Integrated Program
Besides the main content of the integrated program, there
are complementary policies which facilitate the operation of the
program as a technique for changing the structure of the global
value distribution process so as to accelerate the development
254. Id, at 16.
255. Id. at 17.
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of the third world. One objective of the complementary pro-
gram is to preserve the purchasing power of the exports of
developing countries. This has to be understood to mean
preservation of an adequate rate of growth of that purchasing
power and not simply its maintenance at an unchangeable level.
Serious attention to this problem first came from the General
Assembly Resolution 3362 (S-VIII) because of the accelera-
tion of world-wide Inflation since 1969. Between 1954-69 the
annual rate of world inflation, measured by the United Nations
index of prices of manufactures exported by developed market
economy countries, was an average of one percent per year.256
From 1969 to 1973 the rate of Inflation rose to seven percent
and In 1973 and 1974 to eighteen percent. 25 7 It has been esti-
mated that this rate declined somewhat in 1975. Such a rate
of inflation in the prices of manufactured goods in compari-
son with the slow growth or decline in the prices of primary
commodities exported from developing countries is quite far
from the recommendation of the Second Development Decade
(1971-74) of a minimum seven percent growth in real income
necessary for development. To resolve this problem the com-
plementary program proposes international measures first for
the general stabilization of commodity prices and the support
of the real prices of particular commodities, known as an in-
dexing system, and secondly for support of the real export
incomes of individual developing countries.258 The indexing
system refers to either regulation of actual market prices
within individual commodity agreements, known as direct in-
dexing, or financial transfers within individual commodity ar-
rangements or under a comprehensive scheme known as indirect
indexing. On the other hand, actions to support the real in-
comes of exports of Individual developing countries are
achieved either through financial compensation of shortfalls
from target real levels in earnings from the export of par-
ticular commodities similar to the STABEX system of EEC, or
through financial compensation of shortfalls in export In-
comes from planned real levels a form of "supplementary finan-
ci ng."
a. The Indexing System
Indexation refers to a process of relating the prices
256. UNCTAD IV, "Preservation of Purchasing Power of
Developing Countries' Exports," TD/184/Supp. 2 at 2 (1976).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 11. For early UNCTAD studies on indexation
see TD/B/503 9id Supp. I and Supp.l/Add.l. TD/B/C.i/168 and
TD/B/563.
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of primary commodities to manufacturers' goods. The effort is
to ensure that the prices for commodities "in conditions of
inflation . . . [express] correctly in current money units the
real target price or price range specified for the commodity
concerned. "259 Direct indexing is effective through direct
regulation of market prices and thus "would require the estab-
lishment of appropriate mechanisms to adjust the prices at
which international transactions in indexed commodities could
be carried out.'"260 Such a mechanism has been suggested to be
established by the producers' associations, by international
commodity agreements or by bilateral or multilateral long-
term contracts.2 61 The objective of direct indexation In
stabilization of real prices would be implemented by a buffer
stock operation; to improve the real price, then, the control
of supply by the producers is necessary, whether or not a
bufferstock is established.26 2
By contrast, the indirect indexing refers to a finan-
cial transfer without intervention to the operation of com-
modity market. If the price of any commodity was below the
arranged level in any year, financial compensation would be
paid to any exporting country participating in the arrangement.
This process also includes a reverse system, where the price
is above the reference level. The financial transfer ap-
plies only to the developing countries, while the developed
countries are obliged to provide the finances in proportion to
their imports of each related commodity. The financial trans-
fer may also be available through a central international fund
to which the developed countries would contribute at any rate
or proportion they want.2 63
b. The Earning Support System
As mentioned earlier, another system of preserving the
purchasing power In real income of developing countries is to
compensate individual developing countries for the decrease in
their real value of their exports. This is referred to as an
earning support system as a part of the integrated program.
The difference between this system and indirect Indexing is
that while the former provides compensation for decline in
earnings, the latterdoesso for decline in prices. This earn-
259. TD/184/Supp. 2, at 12.
260. TD/B/503/Supp. I, para 155.
261. TD/184/Supp. 2 at 12.
262. For a more detailed description of the direct in-
dexing system see id. at 13-15.
263. For the operation of this system, see id. at 18-21.
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ing support system Is similar to the STABEX scheme established
by the Lome Convention. The STABEX system of the Lome Conven-
tion is a process designed to reduce fluctuations In the real
earnings of 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries
Individually, from their 12 selected primary and 17 semi-
processed commodities. The STABEX scheme formulates a refer-
ence level of earning for each ACP country each year at a
nominal level of each accepted commodity based on the preced-
ing four years. If the earnings of each ACP country from the
accepted commodity in any given year falls below 7.5 percent
and 2.5 percent for the least developed, land-locked and
island countries, the member country is entitled to the
amount of compensation which is the total difference between
the actual earnings and the reference level. The compensa-
tion, of course, is repayable under certain conditions, but
it does not include interest. The STABEX system Is regional
with a smaller number of participants and commodities. The
integrated program of UNCTAD has expanded the STABEX system
to have global implications. It has included almost all de-
veloping countries as participants. The EEC role, however,
is performed by all developed Importing countries, OPEC mem-
bers and developed socialist countries. The number of com-
modities is also expanded to cover the so-called weak com-
modities such as tea, bananas, wine, jute, cotton, iron ore
and manganese ore.
The last recommendation in the complementary part of
the integrated program is supplementary financing. The Idea
of this financing system began with recommendation A.IV.18 of
the first UNCTAD meeting in Geneva In 1964. That recommenda-
tion Invited the World Bank to study the possibility of
setting up a process to deal with the problems arising from
adverse movement In export earnings of developing countries of
a natural or duration which could not be adequately dealt with
by short-term balance-of-payment support. The purpose of the
recommendation was to provide long-term assistance to de-
veloping countries to support their development plans; for
this purpose it defined "adverse movement" as "a shortfall
from reasonable expectations of the level of export proceeds."
The World Bank immediately conducted a study based on the
UNCTAD recommendation.2 6 4 The World Bank in Its study referred
to "reasonable expectations,"2 65 and suggested that the func-
264. IBRD, Supplementary Financial Measures--A Study
requested by the-United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment 1964 (1965).
265. "ITJhere is an Important difference between the
concept of reasonable expectations suitable for a short-term
compensatory finance scheme (such as the IMF compensatory
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tion of supplementary financing would be to estimate the
future revenues of about five years ahead earned from a com-
modity by developing countries upon which each country drew
its development projects. This estimate should be agreed upon
by both a proposed agency and each country. Thus the "refer-
ence levels from which shortfalls in actual earnings would be
measured under such a scheme would differ from those used in
connexion with the IMF's compensatory financing facility in-
asmuch as the latter, being trend values, reflect the actual
course of export earnings, including unexpected adverse move-
ments in term, whereas the former could be the levels planned
and expected under reasonable optimistic assumptions."'2 66
The compensation for differences between the actual earning
and the predicted one is to support the development plans of
developing countries formulated upon a realistic earning ex-
pectation.
E. Recommendations
This new perspective about pricing as a technique of
value distribution is representative of, and responsive to,
new demands and expectations about the structure and function
of the world wealth process. This new perspective emphasizes
the necessity of a coordinated economic policy, incorporating
and interrelating the policies of different wealth practices
and institutions for the promotion of common interests. It
recognizes that unintegrated economic activities for the
achievement of isolated short-term, or even long-term, goals
are not appropriate for present and future demands. Certain
new phenomena, such as resource scarcity and the deterioration
of the environment, in conjunction with increasing demands for
use of resources, have proved that the traditional pricing
technique is incapable of dealing adequately with contemporary
problems.
The fact that the traditional economic system, including
the pricing process, must be changed, despite disagreement among
some economists and nation-states, is coming to be recognized
globally. The resistance of scattered elites and a few states
will not stop this change. A constructive evolution at least
financing facilities) and the assumption regarding export pros-
pects, which is an integral part of a development plan. The
export expectations of a planning authority take account not
only of existing objective factors, but also analyse the im-
pact of new policy measures designed to modify the effect of
these objective factors." Id. at 29-30.
266. TD/184/Supp. 2,-at 28.
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is indispensable to the kind of world order being preferred
by many; indeed, some changes would require a considerable
reconstruction of existing processes. To resist the neces-
sary changes is to deny reality, The reality is that the
pricing process has been largely inadequate to secure value
distributions around the world which are now demanded with in-
creasing effectiveness. The first general recommendation we
make is, therefore, that all observers seek to encourage all
participants in the world process to cooperate in reformu-
lating a new process more compatible with the new demands and
expectations. Such cooperation is indispensable to the es-
tablishment and maintenance of a process responsive to the
common needs of all participants and the vital needs of some.
We sketch some possibilities for change.
I. Basic Policies for Constitutive Process
The proposed integrated program, first suggested by
UNCTAD, includes a comprehensive set of recommendations for
achieving preferred outcomes compatible with community goals.
Its detailed recommendations include a system for interrelating
the prices of raw materials with those of processed materials;
provides a new form of international commodity agreement, sup-
ported by international stock operations and Inclusively
financed; and incorporates strategies designed to stabilize
the income of developing countries and to compensate for fluc-
tuation in prices. The integrated program, however, as is
acknowledged by Its draftsmen, has not served adequately to
protect the interests of developing countries who are not ex-
porters of raw materials. To protect the interests of such
countries we recommend differential pricing policies as part
of a more general preferential treatment scheme. As noted in
the general discussion of policies above, differential pricing
is not new, but rather part of the General Scheme of Prefer-
ences, with a history of some success in practice.
The accommodation of various internal policies of coun-
tries to conform with more inclusive policies as to pricing
should also be given more attention. Sometimes internal bar-
riers such as tax practices and tariff regulations are per-
mitted to interfere with inclusive policies on pricing. This
problem was recognized by UNCTAD in 1964 in a recommendation
adopted by a vote of 79 to 15, with 12 abstentions. Recog-
nizing the adverse effects of higher rates of taxation by de-
veloped countries on the imports of some commodities on the
earnings of developing countries, UNCTAD recommended that "de-
veloped countries should effectively reduce or eliminate bar-
riers and discrimination to the trade and consumption of those
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products, particularly internal taxation, with a view to in-
crease the real income of the developing countries from the
aid exports." 2 67 A number of bilateral and multilateral
agreements have been reached with respect to tax problems.268
Tax issues, however, are only one of many complications which
may arise from the conflict between exclusive and inclusive
pricing policies. In the case of copper, for example, when
the United States government decided to keep the price of raw
copper, but not of fabricated copper products, at artificially
low levels, it threatened to release large quantities from its
strategic stockpile. Through this strategy the United States
government, with the support of the major US copper companies,
succeeded in a policy of holding down prices and, therefore,
deprived certain host countries of the benefit of selling
their copper in a sizable market at the price increase of
1964-1966.269 The major American copper companies did not
lose much by this policy because their profits derived from
fabricated and semi-fabricated goods. 2 70 As one observer has
267. UNCTAD 1964, Final Act and Report, E/Conf. 46/141,
Vol. 1, at 33 Annex A.11-9.
268. See "Analysis of Taxation of Mineral Resources in
Developing Countries (Mining Royalties and Other Fiscal
Measures)," ST/SG/AC.8/R.36; "Exchange of Information: Replies
to the Questionnaire on Authority of Tax Administrations to
Obtain Information, Submitted by the Members from India, Israel
and Pakistan," ST/SG/AC.8/L.6/Add.l; "Exchange of Information;
Questionnaire on Authority of Tax Administrations to Obtain In-
formation," ST/SG/AC.8/L.6; "Exchanging Transfer Prices in Al-
location of Taxable Income among Countries," ST/SG/AC.8/L.3;
"Guidelines for Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing
Countries," ST/ESA/14 (1974). Because of these problems with
respect to tax practices a group of tax experts have been es-
tablished under United Nations Economic and Social Council Res.
1273 XLIII (Aug. 7, 1967) to formulate guidelines which reflect
a compromise between the interest of developed and developing
countries. This group has come up with a series of reports,
"Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries,"
E.69.XVI.2, ST/ESA/]4, "Second Report," E.71.XVI.2, "Third
Report," E.72.XVI.4, "Fourth Report," E.73.XVI.4, and "Fifth
Report," ST/ESA/18. For related documents see UN, "Guidelines
for Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries,"
ST/ESA/14 (1974); UN, "United States of America: Income Tax-
ation of Private Investments in Developing Countries," ST/ESA/
39.
269. Mikdashi, supra note 24, at 91.
270. Semi-manufactured goods were not subject to price
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commented, the control of the United States, in affecting the
international price of copper, appears greater than that of
the producing countries:
Over the long run the United States Govern-
ment has exercised far greater control over
the price of copper [than the governments of
producer countries, like Chile], partly
through tariffs, partly through direct price
and production controls of stimuli, and part-
ly through the operation of a strategic stock-
pile of copper ...
When in the past, prices were driven higher
by collusion, the profits went entirely to
producers and not to host governments. Now
that countries such as Chile could recapture
a large share of those profits, producers are
unable or unwilling to force prices up or to
take full advantage of periods of scarcity.2 71
Considering the interdependencies and interrelationships among
the world's wealth practices and institutions, exclusive pric-
ing policies require constantly to be checked and balanced
against inclusive pricing policies.
2. Improved Functions in the World Constitutive Process
A constitutive process adequately responsive to the de-
manded changes must be a process open to all who can affect, or
are affected by, Its decisions; that is, a process representa-
tive of both producers and consumers. The degree and forms of
participation by these two groups may be dependent upon con-
text. Sometimes, to overcome the inequality in market forces,
collective participation may be preferable to individual par-
ticipation. Similarly, participation in the different func-
tions of the constitutive process, such as intelligence, pro-
motion, prescription, application, and so on, might be made to
differ in different contexts.
One major difficulty in the constitutive process has
traditionally been the lack of necessary and accurate informa-
tion at appropriate times. The significance of the intelli-
gence function in making present decisions and clarifying
future policies for the use of resources is obvious. The role
control. See P. Bohn, Pricing of Copper in International Trade:
A Case StuTdyof Price Stabilization Problem 10 (1968).
271. J. Grunwald & P. Musgrove, Natural Resources in
Latin American Development 232-233 (1970).
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of this function in relation to raw materials in general, and
agricultural commodities and food stuffs in particular, is be-
coming more critical. The Agricultural and Food Organization
in its 1948 Conference referred to the importance of the avail-
ability and exchange of information in the field of food and
agriculture. This need has also been recognized by the pro-
ducers of raw materials; one of the main goals of producers'
associations is to provide Information about the availability
of, demands for and possible continuing roles of, a resource.
In commodity agreements also the need for exchange of informa-
tion has been recognized. An appropriate exchange of informa-
tion can provide the latest news about more adequate tech-
niques in production, distribution and processing of re-
sources, as well as about future substitutes for such re-
sources, all of which may improve the effective consideration
of pricing policies.
The intelligence function in the pricing process has
generally been performed through regional or group associ-
ations. Commodity agreements and producers' associations are,
for example, the most common centers for providing such In-
formation. These regional and group centers, while necessary,
are not enough. They have a tendency to limit their studies
to their immediate exclusive interests on a small geographi-
cal scale. Such limited studies do not inquire into the ef-
fects of particular policies on a larger scale and upon the
more general common interests of the world community. To
solve this problem more inclusive organizations should under-
take appropriate studies, with recommendations, and make such
studies available to the appropriate decision-makers. In the
FAO Conference of 1971 (Rome, Nov. 6-25) this problem re-
ceived attention. The Conference agreed that for several
commodities it was necessary for FAO to provide adequate in-
formation through the Committee on Commodity Problems (CCP).
The Conference agreed that CCP should study and examine the
commodity problems and prescribe recommendations while using
the FAO capabilities in helping the countries most affected as
a result of inadequate policies about those resources. The
role of inclusive organizations in providing information
about commodities might be increased, as recommended in the
UNCTAD proposed integrated program. The scope of studies by
these inclusive organizations could, however, be expanded to
include the gathering and processing of information about na-
tional and regional policies regarding resources which may
have regional or global implications.
The role of the prescribing function at both the region-
al and global levels requires improvement. The regional organ-
izations, including producers' associations, do perform some
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service in this respect, but their formulations are more in
the form of "non-binding" recommendations than of authori-
tative decisions. The implementation of such policies is left
dependent upon the participant's unilateral discretion. In
practice, of course, the regional recommendations are basically
accepted by members, because such recommendations tend to pro-
tect their shared interests. At the international level the
role of inclusive organizations is much weaker in prescribing
pricing policies to protect the common Interest. Appropriate
institutionalization might be sought to increase performances
of this function at the global level; inclusive organizations
might be made competent to appraise national and regional
pricing policies possibly having significant effects on the
common interest. Inclusive organizations might also employ
their general facilities and skills to assist exclusive or
regional organizations in implementing their pricing policies
which contribute to the well-being of the most comprehensive
community.
Consideration might be given, finally, to the establish-
ment of an organization open to all interested parties for
the continued discussion and evaluation of all factors af-
fecting pricing in its broadest aspects and of possible prac-
tices in the constitutive process for implementation of basic
policies related to the pricing process. The bringing to-
gether of all interested parties in a process of continuous
negotiation might in itself produce an effective informal per-
formance of some of the relevant decision functions. The com-
petence of this organization might be limited or expanded, de-
pending upon context and acceptability. The fact that the or-
ganization was functioning even without explicit effective
power, could provide a forum for direct communication between
the interested parties. Such a forum might facilitate under-
standing of the problems involved, particularly with respect
to vital resources, and increase the possibility of a more
relevant appraisal of decisions.
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